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The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in
Removal Proceedings
Jason A. Cade*
Prosecutorial discretion is a critical part of the administration of immigration law. This
Article considers the work and responsibilities of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) trial attorneys, who thus far have not attracted significant scholarly attention, despite
playing a large role in the ground-level implementation of immigration law and policy. The
Article makes three main contributions. First, I consider whether ICE attorneys have a duty to
help ensure that the removal system achieves justice, rather than indiscriminately seek removal
in every case and by any means necessary. As I demonstrate, trial attorneys have concrete
obligations derived from statutory provisions, case law, and administrative guidance to seek
legitimate objectives, take steps to ensure procedural justice, and exercise equitable discretion in
appropriate cases. Second, I argue that the removal system lacks serious structural features to
ensure these obligations are met, and as a result, prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial
conduct vary significantly across and within jurisdictions. Little prevents ICE attorneys from
indiscriminately pursuing enforcement objectives at the expense of seeing justice done. This
matters today, more than ever, because of the categorical and categorically unforgiving nature of
the modern statutory removal scheme and the risk of erroneous detentions and removals. Third,
the Article develops important parallels between ICE attorneys and criminal prosecutors,
suggesting that the immigration system might borrow some of the administrative features
*
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employed in criminal systems to encourage earlier prosecutorial screening of cases for positive
discretion and equalize some of the power asymmetries that can result in unjust outcomes. I
sketch the contours of four such reforms that could be readily implemented without the need for
congressional action.
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INTRODUCTION

The Executive Branch enjoys an unmatched degree of discretion
in its enforcement of immigration laws against deportable noncitizens.
This is so in part for doctrinal reasons: while courts are reluctant to
scrutinize enforcement decisions in all regulatory arenas,1 the United
1.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (articulating the judicial
presumption against reviewing agency’s decisions not to undertake enforcement action).
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States Supreme Court’s extreme deference to legislative and executive
policy decisions in the immigration context renders selective
prosecution challenges nearly nonjusticiable.2 There is also a systemic
basis for the great discretion. While congressional funding levels
permit the removal of approximately 400,000 noncitizens per year, the
current unauthorized population in the United States is estimated at 11
million.3 There are also millions more lawfully present noncitizens
who are potentially removable on the basis of criminal history and
immigration violations. 4 When the pool of potential targets for
enforcement dwarfs the government’s resources, discretion inevitably
comes into play, whether at the macro level of setting policy or the
micro level of implementation in individual cases. Indeed, the Court
observed recently that enforcement discretion is a “principal feature”
of the immigration system.5
While every presidential administration since the enactment of
the first exclusion and deportation laws has developed its own
priorities for the deployment of enforcement resources,6 a number of
developments have thrust the role of immigration prosecutorial
discretion into the spotlight. These include the rise of state and local
participation in the removal system,7 the Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) high-profile establishment of tiered priorities for

2.
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-92 (1999)
(rejecting the challenge to selective enforcement of immigration laws based on constitutionally protected associational activities); Carranza v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
277 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Court has made it plain that no general constitutional
right exists for an alien . . . to review prosecutorial deliberations in order to forfend
removal.”); see Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611,
628-30 (2006).
See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All ICE Employees, ICE
3.
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf
(stating that the immigration system can process only about 400,000 of the estimated 11
million undocumented persons in the United States per year); Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera
Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, PEW RES.
CENTER 9 tbl.2 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (showing the
estimates of the unauthorized population fluctuated between 10 and 12 million between the
years 2004 and 2010).
See discussion infra Part II.A.
4.
5.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law,
6.
119 YALE L.J. 458, 511-21 (2009) (explaining that executive immigration enforcement
priorities have shifted over time, as illustrated through various administrations’ policies
targeting criminal justice systems, workplaces, or private homes).
7.
Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008).
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immigration enforcement,8 and the Obama Administration’s decision
in 2012 to categorically afford temporary reprieves from deportation to
undocumented youth who meet certain criteria.9
Such events have sparked a burgeoning literature on the role of
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration removal system. Most
scholarship in this area focuses on the propriety of the Obama
Administration’s categorical enforcement priorities. 10 Others have
explored the influence that nonfederal actors have on the
implementation of those priorities, for example, through state and local
immigration arrests11 or through the choices prosecutors make in the
criminal justice system.12 This Article contributes to this literature by
8.
See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, ICE, to All ICE
Employees, ICE (June 30, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforce
ment-priorities.pdf (setting forth the agency’s priorities for removal in light of limited
resources).
See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
9.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferredaction-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Oct. 27, 2014).
10. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 511-21 (explaining that Congress,
through legislation that vastly expands the population of deportable noncitizens in the United
States, has conferred de facto discretionary authority to the Executive Branch to determine
which deportable noncitizens to pursue); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:

The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013) (arguing that categorically extending
deferred action to qualifying undocumented youth violates the President’s duty to execute the
laws faithfully); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010) (analyzing historical antecedents of
deferred action policies and exploring parallels between prosecutorial discretion in criminal
and immigration law); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion:
The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, YALE L.J.F. 167 (Dec. 20,
2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration-enforcement-discretionthe-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-Kris-Kobachs-latest-crusade (arguing that Executive Branch
determinations about immigration enforcement priorities, including categorical deferred
action programs, are supported by statutory authority and policy grounds); Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Response, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 64-66 (2013), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Wadhia.pdf
(arguing that the DACA prosecutorial discretion program is legally justified).
11. Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration
Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1433-37 (2011); Hiroshi
Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1848-58 (2011) (explaining
how developments in immigration enforcement allow state and local decision makers to “act
as gatekeepers, filling the enforcement pipeline with cases of their choice”); Jason A. Cade,
Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth Amendment,
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 182-83 (Nov. 2013), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/Cade-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-Sidebar-180.pdf (summarizing how cooperative
relationships, data-sharing technology, and state legislation have given state and local officers
a significant role in selecting immigrants referred for removal hearings).
12. Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice
for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1 (2012); Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis
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turning attention to important but undertheorized players in
immigration enforcement discretion: the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) attorneys who represent the government in
immigration court.13
ICE’s trial attorneys are charged with “protecting the homeland”
by diligently litigating removal cases against “undesirable”
noncitizens, especially those who pose security risks, attempt to obtain
immigration benefits through fraud, or have a criminal history.14 To do
this work, they must establish grounds for removal, test the credibility
of claims for asylum or other discretionary relief, and represent the
government’s position on the necessity of a noncitizen’s detention. In
light of their enforcement-oriented responsibilities within an
adversarial removal system, trial attorneys have sometimes been
characterized as the government’s “gladiators” or the nation’s
“gatekeepers.”15
Discretion permeates the work of attorneys, who are variably
referred to as trial attorneys, ICE prosecutors, or assistant chief
counsel. They decide whether to pursue removal, which charges to
levy, what trial tactics to employ, and whether to appeal adverse
decisions in the hundreds of thousands of cases that make their way
through our nation’s immigration courts every year.
These
discretionary decisions matter for several reasons.
First, the
categorical and categorically unforgiving nature of the current
immigration code makes vast numbers of noncitizens removable on
for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013); Stephen Lee, De
Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553 (2013).
13. A few recent or forthcoming articles touch on various aspects of the role of ICE’s
trial attorneys in immigration enforcement. See, e.g., Cade, supra note 11, at 185, 201-03
(analyzing ICE prosecutors’ gate-keeping role in the immigration enforcement system where
there have been upstream violations of constitutional rights); Erin B. Corcoran, Seek Justice,
Not Just Deportation: How To Improve Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 48
LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that ICE attorneys have ethical duties to seek
justice); Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror: Discovery in Immigration Court,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1569 (2014) (analyzing discovery asymmetries between ICE and
noncitizen respondents); Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and
Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195
(2014) (arguing that DHS’s focus on criminal enforcement has frustrated the implementation
of prosecutorial discretion priorities throughout the agency).
14. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
15. See, e.g., Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The Contradictions of
Protecting Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 612 (2000) (“The role of the INS is that of a gatekeeper, not a
disinterested party concerned with assessing the needs of children.”); Won Kidane, The
Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45 AKRON L. REV. 647, 655 (2012)
(describing ICE prosecutors as the government’s “gladiator-attorneys”).
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the basis of immigration infractions or low-level criminal activity,
while preventing immigration judges from even considering equitable
relief. 16 Enforcement discretion thus injects flexibility into an
otherwise rigid system, so that the complexity of an individual’s
situation may be taken into account when necessary to avoid an overly
harsh application of statutory law. Second, ICE prosecutors are
frontline gatekeepers of a system characterized by the pervasive use of
detention, extreme backlogs, and weak process rights relative to the
stakes. These features elevate both the potential for erroneous results
and the costs to taxpayers, noncitizens, and their families.
In light of the vast space for discretion in the removal system and
the high stakes, do ICE attorneys have a duty to “seek justice”? Some
scholars and courts have suggested that, like other government
attorneys, they do, but the contours of this duty in immigration
proceedings have never been clearly or comprehensively defined. One
contribution of this Article, then, is to show that ICE prosecutors do
have certain concrete responsibilities—expressed in statutory
provisions, case law, and agency guidance—to seek legitimate
objectives, take steps to ensure procedural justice, and exercise
equitable discretion in appropriate cases. Together these obligations
comprise at least the minimal components of a prosecutorial duty to
help the removal system achieve justice, rather than to pursue removal
orders in every case and by any means necessary.17
While their dual obligations to effective enforcement and
individualized justice will sometimes clearly align, the available
evidence suggests that in many cases ICE attorneys are ineffectively
identifying cases in which zealous enforcement should be tempered by
discretion and the pursuit of justice. Indeed, significant disparities in
government attorneys’ approach to the exercise of discretion and
litigation tactics mark the immigration system. To begin with, the
application of agency guidelines for equitable discretion in appropriate
cases varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as indicated by
data showing that just five immigration hearing locations account for
more than half of all discretionary case closures nationwide in recent
years.18 Other findings indicate that low priority or humanitarian cases
are closed inconsistently, especially in cases involving pro se or
detained noncitizens.19
16.
17.
18.
19.

See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
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ICE’s failure to adequately screen the merits of the cases it
pursues is also evidenced by recent data on immigration court
outcomes showing that despite statutory rigidity, immigration judges
ultimately reject ICE’s request for removal orders at an astonishingly
high rate: almost 50% of the time. 20 Finally, court observers,
advocates, and federal judges have noted the fervent manner in which
some ICE attorneys prosecute removal cases, for example by pursuing
inaccurate or inflated grounds for removal; declining to negotiate,
stipulate, or even communicate with noncitizens or their
representatives before hearings; failing to turn over evidence bearing
on removability; and sometimes opposing discretionary relief no
matter how clear the merits or how strong the equities.21 These
observations tend to be anecdotal, but they are pervasive enough to
warrant further scrutiny of the role of ICE in immigration court.
Two forces in particular appear to motivate some trial attorneys to
prioritize an aggressive one-size-fits-all approach over nuanced
discretion and attention to individual justice. First, ICE’s lawenforcement, national-security mission—long a feature of the
immigration agency’s culture, but one that became especially
prominent following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11)—may have overridden its agents’ concomitant obligation to
ensure the system does not deport those who have the right to stay or
upon whom the law falls too harshly.22 This hypothesis has intuitive
appeal and is supported by literature that posits the general tendency of
“prosecutor bias” to subvert other agency objectives.23 Second, the vast
population of potentially deportable noncitizens relative to current
prosecutorial and adjudicative resources, in combination with a steady
pipeline of immigration arrests by both federal agents and nonfederal
“force multipliers,”24 has created overwhelming caseloads in many
immigration courts. 25 Excessive workloads lead to prosecutorial
inattention.26 The agency itself has acknowledged that its attorneys
20. See discussion infra Parts III.B, V.E.
21. See discussion infra Parts III.B-D.
22. See Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1656 (2013); Rabin, supra note 13, at 209-35; discussion infra Parts
II.C.1, IV.A.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
24. Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
26. Cf. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests:
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261
(2011) (making this observation about overworked criminal prosecutors).
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have “extremely limited” time for preparation, sometimes averaging as
little as twenty minutes per case.27
The upshot is that while the Executive Branch plainly expects its
attorneys to help facilitate justice in removal proceedings, it has failed
to provide them with structural mechanisms and incentives sufficient
to consistently overcome institutionalized enforcement biases and
intense workloads. As a result, little constrains ICE attorneys from
privileging their protector role over their minister-of-justice role, even
at the expense of consistency, accuracy, fairness, and adherence to
agency directives intended to avoid undue harshness and make the
most of limited resources. ICE’s enforcement culture and workload
burdens are unlikely to change, at least in the near future. So the
question facing the Executive Branch is whether and how it can adopt
realistic measures inducing its agents to exercise discretion more
consistently and to litigate more fairly.
I argue that the government should look to the nation’s criminal
systems, where comparable enforcement biases and workload
pressures complicate prosecutors’ navigation of similar obligations to
enforcement and justice. As criminal law scholars have observed, the
challenges presented by these competing responsibilities are very real,
even for the most seasoned and conscientious prosecutors.28 Although
they are not homogenous, the nation’s federal and state criminal
systems make use of various pretrial procedural rules and design
features that significantly increase the likelihood that cases will be
screened in a meaningful way and that power asymmetries between the
government and the defendant will be ameliorated. In particular, this
Article focuses on four features of criminal systems: (1) disclosure
obligations, (2) vertical prosecution, (3) responsibility and authority to
screen and decline removal cases, and (4) prehearing conferences.
These mechanisms, which are rooted primarily in statutory or
administrative policy, rather than in constitutional commands, impose
manageable costs relative to likely gains and could be implemented

27. Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, AM. U. WASH. C.L. 1 (Oct. 24, 2005),
http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materials/immigration/enforcementdetention-and-criminal-justice/government-documents/22092975-ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prose
cutorial-Discretion-William-J-Howard-10-24-05.pdf.
28. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 15-18 (2007); Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their
Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2161 (2010).
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through agency policy changes or rulemaking, without the need for
congressional legislation.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on
the current removal system, ICE prosecutors’ role within it, and the
sources of their obligations as both protectors and ministers of justice.
Part III shows that discretion is exercised inconsistently under the
current system and that many trial attorneys litigate removal cases in
ways that impede, rather than advance, the cause of justice. Part IV
outlines the most plausible explanations for this state of affairs: a
culture of enforcement stringency and the reality of a heavy workload,
neither of which is likely to change. Accordingly, I argue in Part IV.C
that DHS should look to the criminal system, where similar forces that
work against prosecutorial justice-seeking duties are counteracted by
measures that improve prosecutorial accountability and reduce power
imbalances. Part V focuses on four mechanisms in particular that
would work to increase ICE prosecutors’ attentiveness to all their
duties. The net result should be earlier screening, improved prehearing
communication and information flow, and greater exercise of
discretion in favor of noncitizens, thus nudging ICE attorneys to fulfill
their obligation to help the immigration system achieve justice. I
address implementation concerns in Part V.E.
II.

ICE TRIAL ATTORNEYS’ ROLE IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT

A. The Current Statutory Removal Scheme
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) makes noncitizens
subject to detention and deportation on the basis of a wide range of
immigration violations and minor crimes, providing for only narrow
grounds of relief. Many commentators, including myself, have written
on the expansive and unforgiving nature of modern statutory grounds
for removal.29 I briefly revisit the subject here only to provide context
for unfamiliar readers and to underscore the importance of
29. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479-80, 1483 (2010) (discussing
Congress’s elimination of section 212(c)’s other forms of discretionary relief for persons with
criminal convictions); Cade, supra note 12, at 1752-63, 1775-90; Daniel Kanstroom,

Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of
Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 651-52 (2004); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New
Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 469, 482-86 (2007); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936,
1938-41 (2000).
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prosecutorial discretion in (1) reducing the likelihood of erroneous
detentions or deportations and (2) identifying cases where strict
enforcement would lead to unjust results.
For much of the twentieth century, statutory deportation grounds
were generally subject to limitations that prevented lawful-resident
noncitizens from being deported on the basis of conduct that occurred
long ago or after they had been lawfully admitted for a significant
period of time.30 Additionally, those who were subject to deportation
were usually afforded the opportunity to argue that their positive
equities and connections in the United States outweighed the gravity of
their infractions, even where convicted of serious criminal activity.31
In the 1990s, the United States Congress widely expanded the
categories of deportable offenses while sharply constricting
opportunities for discretionary relief from removal at both the federal
and state levels.32 Many minor offenses now fall within the statute’s
capacious list of “aggravated felonies,” which trigger mandatory
detention, deportation, and a permanent bar on lawful return to the
United States.33 For example, simple marijuana possession with a oneyear sentence and misdemeanor battery with a year of probation can
qualify as aggravated felonies, as can convictions for selling ten
dollars’ worth of marijuana, shoplifting fifteen dollars’ worth of baby
clothes, or forging a check for less than twenty dollars.34 Noncitizens
deportable on the aggravated felony ground are ineligible for most
forms of adjudicative discretionary relief, regardless of the strength of
their ties in the United States, the passage of time since their offense,
or whether their offense was classified as an aggravated felony at the
time of conviction.35
30. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 671-73 (7th ed. 2012); Neuman, supra note 2, at 621-24.
31. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66
Stat. 163, 187 (1952), repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597.
32. See IIRIRA, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 28,
and 42 U.S.C.); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 and 29 U.S.C.).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2012); see also id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (“Any
alien . . . who again seeks admission . . . at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony[] is inadmissible.”).
34. See Cade, supra note 12, at 1759.
35. Before 1996, immigration judges were authorized by section 212(c) of the INA to
determine whether deportation was warranted in individual cases based on factors like the
nature of the offense, the length of the noncitizen’s residence, the hardship to family members
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Crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), another deportation
category, also can include relatively minor offenses, even if the
criminal punishment levied consists only of a fine or community
service.36 For example, CIMTs include petty shoplifting,37 theft of
service offenses like turnstile jumping, 38 misdemeanor indecent
exposure, 39 and passing bad checks. 40 Although not explicitly
prohibited from seeking discretionary relief from an immigration
judge, permanent residents deportable under this provision are
foreclosed from establishing the seven-year residency requirement to
qualify for cancellation of removal due to a stop-time rule.41
Any controlled substance offense makes a lawfully present
noncitizen deportable and subject to mandatory detention, with the
narrow exception of a single conviction for simple possession of thirty
grams or less of marijuana.42 Convictions classified as domestic
violence crimes trigger another ground for deportation.43 Many states
punish misdemeanor drug offenses only with small fines,44 but the
leniency of punishment is not a relevant factor in triggering the
controlled substance or domestic violence grounds of removal, even if
it means the state was not constitutionally required to afford the
defendant a right to counsel or trial by jury.45 Indeed, even where
that would be caused by the noncitizen’s deportation, evidence of rehabilitation, and so forth.
INA § 212(c) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (CIMT within five years of admission). Two CIMTs
make a noncitizen deportable regardless of whether either was committed within five years of
admission. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
37. Da Rosa Silva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that shoplifting is a crime constituting moral turpitude).
38. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
39. See In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79 (B.I.A. 2013) (holding that a
violation of section 314(1) of the California Penal Code, which includes misdemeanor-level
indecent exposure, is a CIMT).
40. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. § 2C:21-2.4 (2014) (classifying the offense of passing bad
checks as a “disorderly persons offense”); Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir. 1935)
(describing check forgery as an offense that involves moral turpitude); Susan L. Pilcher,
Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV.
269, 312-13 (1997) (explaining that passing bad checks is a crime that may involve moral
turpitude under deportation law).
41. Morawetz, supra note 29, at 1941 (observing that the commission of a crime
stops the accumulation of seven years’ residence for purposes of qualifying for cancellation
of removal).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
43. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
44. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2007); MINN. STAT.
§ 152.027(4) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.336 (2013); N.J. STAT. § 2C:35-10(a)(4) (2014);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.05, .10 (McKinney 2008).
45. In re Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850, 851-55 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that a
municipal marijuana violation where the defendant was not afforded a right to counsel or
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noncitizens charged with drug, domestic violence, or other offenses
enter a diversionary program, in which criminal adjudication and
sentencing is deferred and dismissed upon successful completion of
the program’s requirements, federal law treats the result as a conviction
for immigration purposes if the noncitizen had to plead guilty to
qualify for the program.46 An emerging but robust body of work
suggests that misdemeanor convictions are often unreliable indicators
of guilt, due to the exploding number of misdemeanor prosecutions
and weak process rights in many lower-level courts throughout the
United States, despite the significant collateral consequences that can
follow such convictions.47 Yet most convictions leading to immigration
consequences are in fact misdemeanors.48

advised of potential immigration consequences counts as a conviction for immigration
purposes); Cade, supra note 12, at 1778 (discussing states that do not provide counsel to
misdemeanor defendants where incarceration is not at issue).
46. See Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 380-81,
394-96 (2012) (discussing the tension between the operation of federal immigration law and
states’ goals in diversionary or deferred adjudication programs); The Immigration
Consequences of Deferred Adjudication Programs in New York City, N.Y.C. BAR 1-4 (June
2007), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Immigration.pdf. Many states require a plea of
guilty before a defendant can enter a diversionary program. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.1068 (2014) (declaring that the drug treatment diversionary program requires a guilty
plea); id. § 769.4a (declaring that the domestic violence diversionary program requires a
person be found guilty or plead guilty); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05 (McKinney 2007)
(declaring that a drug treatment diversionary program requires a guilty plea); OKLA. STAT. tit.
43A, § 3-452 (2013) (same).
47. John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication
of Misdemeanors in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
20 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Cade, supra note 12, at 1753-56; Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 277 (2011); see also Robert C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste:
The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. 11
(Apr. 2009), http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808
(explaining that the large volume of misdemeanor cases has led to innocent defendants being
forced to plead guilty); No Day in Court: Marijuana Possession Cases and the Failure of the
Bronx Criminal Courts, BRONX DEFENDERS (May 2013), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/No-Day-in-Court-A-Report-by-The-Bronx-Defenders-May-2013.pdf
(explaining how insufficient procedural safeguards in the Bronx misdemeanor courts have left
many defendants unable to effectively contest the charges leveled against them); The
Spangenberg Grp., Status of Indigent Defense in New York: A Study for Chief Judge Kaye’s
Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services, N.Y. CTS. 143 (June 16, 2006), http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf (arguing that
a lack of funding has left New York’s indigent defense system unable to provide effective
representation).
48. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes,
Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/moredeportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html.
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As for noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents, the
statute prescribes removal for those who entered without inspection,49
as well as for a wide variety of immigration violations committed after
lawful admission.50 There is no statutory exception for noncitizens
who entered the United States as young children and never left.
Eligibility for consideration of discretionary relief from removal is
very tightly constrained: the noncitizen must show ten years of
continuous physical presence in the United States, ten years of “good
moral character,” and that removal would result in “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to their spouse, parent, or child—as long
as the qualifying family member is a citizen or lawful permanent
resident.51 Commission of a removable offense, or service of the
removal proceedings charging document, stops the accrual of time for
purposes of establishing continuous residence.52 Additionally, only
4,000 persons, whether lawful permanent residents or not, may be
granted cancellation of removal per year.53
In sum, immigration violations and minor convictions may
trigger removal for noncitizens despite their lawful presence and
without respect to their equities. Outside of the strict criteria described
above, the statute does not limit removal based on consideration of the
length of residence, contributions to society, or the number and
strength of relationships with U.S. citizen family members. This
sweeping, categorical, and unforgiving approach thus elevates the role
of enforcement discretion, which must compensate for the statute’s
lack of nuance.

49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (“[A noncitizen is inadmissible if] present
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at
any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., id. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (stating that a noncitizen is deportable if they were
inadmissible for any reason when they entered the United States); id. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (stating
that a noncitizen is deportable for overstaying an authorized period of admission); id.
§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (stating that a noncitizen is deportable for violating the conditions of
admission); id. § 1227(a)(3) (stating that a noncitizen is deportable for failing to register or
provide notice of a change of address); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (stating that noncitizens in the
United States who previously accrued at least six months of unlawful presence and then
departed the United States are inadmissible for various statutory periods and are therefore
removable).
51. See id. § 1229b(b). The exceptional and extremely unusual hardship threshold is
applied rigorously. See In re Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002).
52. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
53. See id. § 1229b(e).
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Overview of Removal Proceedings

Removal proceedings are administrative adjudication hearings
intended to determine a noncitizen’s eligibility to remain in the United
States. Immigration judges adjudicate removal proceedings and
related matters under the auspices of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), a subagency within the Department of
Justice (DOJ).54 Immigration judges are “career attorneys” employed
for indefinite terms.55 Immigration court is adversarial: trial attorneys
prosecute on behalf of the government while the noncitizen appears
pro se unless they can retain an attorney. There is no right to appointed
counsel in immigration court, and just under half of all noncitizens
proceed without representation.56
Removal proceedings are commenced through a charging
document called a Notice To Appear (NTA).57 The NTA must specify
“[t]he charges against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to
have been violated.”58 The immigration judge acquires jurisdiction
once an NTA has been issued to a respondent and filed in the
immigration court. 59 Although the trial attorneys have exclusive
authority to conduct removal prosecutions, a variety of ICE officers, as
well as officers from other agencies within DHS, are also authorized to
initiate such proceedings.60 In fact, the trial attorneys themselves often
54. EOIR at a Glance, DOJ (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/
EOIRataGlance09092010.htm.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4); Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Enhancing
Quality and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. 7 (June 7,
2012), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timelinessin-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf; Judicial Oversight v. Judicial
Independence, TRAC (2008), http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/include/side_
4.html.
56. FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook, DOJ F1 (Apr. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy13syb.pdf (reporting that in FY2012, 50% of respondents were represented in
removal proceedings). Noncitizens do enjoy the “privilege of being represented, at no
expense to the Government, by counsel of the [noncitizen’s] choosing who is authorized to
practice in such proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). Such representation frequently does
not involve a lawyer, as permitted “counsel” in immigration matters includes law students,
EOIR-accredited nonlawyer representatives, and, in certain circumstances, other “reputable
individuals.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1292.1-.2 (2014).
57. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO
PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION
OF REMOVAL CASES 1-5, 1-10 to -11 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.p
df. The NTA is Form I-862. Id. at 1-18 n.98.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(D). NTAs must also contain various notices to the
respondent. See id. § 1229(a).
59. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14.
60. See id. § 239.1 (listing officers authorized to issue NTAs).
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do not make the decision to file a charging document with the
immigration court and instead are typically assigned to cases only later
in the process.61
At a “master calendar” hearing (similar to a criminal arraignment), a group of respondents appears before an immigration judge.62
Each case is called individually before the judge, who must determine
whether the noncitizen understands the charges in the NTA and notify
the noncitizen of the right to seek representation at no expense to the
government.63 Immigration judges also use master calendar hearings
to take noncitizens’ pleas in response to the allegations of removability
set forth in the NTA. 64 Often noncitizens simply admit to the
government’s charges, and the judge makes a finding of removability.65
If the noncitizen contests removability by denying some or all of
the allegations in the NTA, the government has the burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is in fact
not a citizen,66 which shifts the burden to the respondent to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is nevertheless lawfully
present in the United States.67 If the noncitizen can establish lawful
presence, the burden shifts back to ICE to prove removability, again by
clear and convincing evidence. To meet their burden, trial attorneys
generally rely on documents concerning the noncitizen that are
maintained in the government’s “A-file.”68 In cases involving lawful
61. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 57, at 1-11 to -13 (providing statistics for
FY2004 to FY2009 on agencies and units initiating removal proceedings); see discussion
infra Part V.B.
62. See Immigration Judge Benchbook: Introduction to the Master Calendar, DOJ,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Purpose_and_History_of_MC.pdf (last updated
Aug. 2014).
63. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a); Immigration Judge Benchbook: Introduction to the
Master Calendar, supra note 62.
64. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c). Trial attorneys can lodge additional grounds of
removability at later stages of proceedings. Id. § 1240.10(e).
65. EOIR at a Glance, supra note 54 (“In most removal proceedings, individuals
admit that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms of relief.”).
66. In re Corona-Palomera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 661 F.2d 814, 817
(9th Cir. 1981). Often this burden is met through the noncitizen’s statements at the time of
apprehension, or other alienage information contained in the Form I-213 that ICE submits at
the master calendar hearing. See In re Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 784, 785 (B.I.A.
1999) (holding that Form I-213 is “inherently trustworthy” to establish alienage unless there
is evidence that it contains incorrect information or “was obtained by coercion or duress”).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2012); id. § 1361.
68. See Privacy Act; Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS) Systems of
Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 1755, 1757 (Jan. 16, 2007) (“The hardcopy paper A-File (which, prior
to 1940, was called Citizenship File (C-File[)] contains all the individual’s official record
material such as: naturalization certificates; various forms and attachments (e.g.,
photographs); applications and petitions for benefits under the immigration and nationality

16

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1

permanent residents who have been convicted of a crime, for example,
the prosecutor might introduce a record of conviction from criminal
court and argue that it falls within one of the INA’s criminal grounds
for removal. 69 The noncitizen (or their representative) has the
opportunity to contest the government’s evidence, although discovery
is quite limited in practice.70 Proceedings establishing removability can
take place across one or more master calendar or individual hearings,
depending on the complexity of the issues.
After removability is established through the noncitizen’s
admissions or the government’s satisfaction of its evidentiary burden,
the immigration judge either enters an order of deportation, or, if the
noncitizen appears eligible for some form of discretionary relief,
schedules the matter for a merits hearing.71 At the merits hearing, ICE
attorneys can challenge the noncitizen’s asserted grounds for a right to
remain, which typically involve asylum,72 cancellation of removal,73 or
adjustment of status.74
At each stage of the removal proceeding, the trial attorney wields
discretion. Foremost, the attorney has discretion with respect to
whether even to pursue removal against a particular noncitizen.75 In
regional offices where trial attorneys have the opportunity to screen
NTAs before they are filed, such discretion comes into play before
laws; reports of investigations; statements; reports; correspondence; and memoranda on each
individual for whom DHS has created a record under the Immigration and Nationality Act.”).
69. Alternatively, if the case involves a noncitizen alleged to have overstayed a visa,
the prosecutor would submit government-maintained documents showing issuance of a visa
to the noncitizen with an expiration date that has now passed. Or, if the matter involves a
noncitizen alleged to have entered the country without being lawfully admitted, the
prosecutor might establish removability by submitting a foreign birth certificate with details
matching those of the noncitizen.
70. See discussion infra Part III.C.
71. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2014); see Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1641-42 (2010).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (making asylum available to persons who can establish that they
face persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion, and who meet other statutory requirements).
73. Id. § 1229b(a) (establishing discretionary cancellation of removal for lawful
permanent residents who have lawfully resided in the United States for at least seven years);
id. § 1229b(b)(1) (establishing that discretionary cancellation of removal for persons who are
not lawful permanent residents requires that they have ten years of physical presence and that
they make a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualifying family
members).
74. See id. § 1255(a) (indicating that, subject to exceptions, a noncitizen can adjust
their status to that of a lawful permanent resident without processing abroad through the
consulate if they have an immigrant visa immediately available at the time the application is
filed).
75. See Cade, supra note 11.
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proceedings begin.76 They have the authority to cancel NTAs for legal
insufficiency or to decline to file the charging document with court, in
the exercise of discretion.77 When other immigration officers from
ICE or the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issue
NTAs to noncitizens and initiate proceedings without trial attorney
review, as is common in many jurisdictions, trial attorneys can still
move to close or terminate proceedings administratively.78 They can
also consent to relief or decline to appeal an immigration judge’s
decision in favor of the noncitizen.79 Additionally, ICE prosecutors
have discretion over how to pursue the removal of a noncitizen. For
example, they decide what evidence and tactics to use in establishing
removability or contesting eligibility for relief. The authority for
immigration prosecutorial discretion is both explicitly recognized in
top-level DHS policy memoranda 80 and inherent in a massive
enforcement scheme where resource constraints allow officials to
process only a tiny fraction of the total number of persons eligible for
sanctions.81
76. See, e.g., Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office (Dec.
20, 2013) (stating that attorneys in her office typically review NTAs before filing them with
the court) (on file with author).
77. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a) (2014) (providing authority to cancel NTAs for legal
insufficiency); see also In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 281, 284 (B.I.A. 1998) (“We recognize
that the decision to institute deportation proceedings involves the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and is not a decision which the Immigration Judge or the Board may review.
Likewise, a Service officer authorized to issue a Notice to Appear has complete power to
cancel such notice prior to jurisdiction vesting with the Immigration Judge.” (citations
omitted)); Benson & Wheeler, supra note 55, at 38 (“ICE officials told us that ICE trial
attorneys have the authority to reject insufficient NTAs . . . .”); Memorandum from William J.
Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27, at 5
(encouraging ICE prosecutors not to file NTAs until decisions are made on certain visa
applications).
78. 8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(c), 1239.2(c); see also In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 281
(“Once the charging document is filed with the Immigration Court and jurisdiction is vested
in the Immigration Judge, the Service may move to terminate the proceedings, but it may not
simply cancel the charging document.”).
79. According to one trial attorney I spoke with, in her office supervisory approval is
not needed to decline to appeal an immigration judge’s decision. Interview with ICE Trial
Attorney in Large Urban Office (Sept. 10, 2013) (on file with author).
80. See discussion infra Part II.C.2; Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE
Employees, supra note 3 (setting forth guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
in light of the fact that the immigration system can process only about 400,000 of the
estimated 11 million undocumented persons in the United States per year).
81. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13-16 (2010) (discussing the inherent discretion in large enforcement
bureaucracies); KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42924,
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES 8-13 (2013)
(discussing authority for executive prosecutorial discretion in immigration law).
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Competing Objectives and Expectations

There is little doubt that ICE prosecutors, like all immigration
officers, have significant responsibilities. As Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar has observed, “A country’s approach to immigration is a major
feature of its national architecture, defining the scope of a national
community as well as functional issues of economic consequences and
security-related concerns.”82 Trial attorneys thus administer laws that
bear on the nation’s public safety and security. At the same time, trial
attorneys are expected to prosecute suspected immigration violators in
ways that make the removal adjudication system as just and accurate as
possible, especially in light of the categorical nature of the modern
statutory scheme. This Subpart describes these often competing
objectives and expectations.
1.

Enforcers and Protectors

In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress in 2003
created DHS, a cabinet-level agency, through the merger of twenty-two
agencies and programs with responsibility for various national security
functions. 83 As part of this merger, Congress dissolved the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and distributed its
enforcement and service functions among three subagencies: United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), CBP, and ICE.
Whereas the INS was responsible for both deporting immigration
violators and implementing immigration laws’ humanitarian and
benefits components, under DHS these functions were segregated,
with ICE and CBP sharing enforcement responsibilities and USCIS
alone administering the benefits scheme.84 From its inception, then,
ICE has viewed its mission as safeguarding the nation’s security

82. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1, 26 (2012); see also id. at 33 (“Finally, immigration, at its core, is a means
through which we delimit national communities in a world where laws and societies are
defined—at least in principle—by the scope of the nation-state.”); Peter H. Schuck,
Importing Diversity: Immigration, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Feb. 16, 2002), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=305801 (explaining how U.S. immigration laws
historically have both encouraged and limited diversity in this country).
83. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
84. Rabin, supra note 13, at 216-17; Difference Between U.S. Customs and Border

Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Sept. 4, 2014),
10:37 AM), https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/1040/~/difference-between-u.s.-customsand-border-protection-(cbp),-u.s.-citizenship.
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through the enforcement of immigration laws, and its relationship with
noncitizens has been one of opposition.85
To be sure, the enforcement objective took center stage within the
immigration agency long before 9/11. Indeed, “From its founding in
1891 until the early 1920s, the [Immigration] Service’s functions were
few and they were overwhelmingly enforcement-oriented . . . .”86 In
the early years of immigration policy, the INS primarily was
responsible for the exclusion of “certain categories of undesirables.”87
Over time, Congress added more and more grounds for excluding or
deporting noncitizens, especially those with criminal histories. 88
Scholars have widely noted how legislation in the mid-1990s
galvanized associations between immigrants and criminality by
expanding grounds for deportation on the basis of convictions,
narrowing opportunities for relief from removal, and mandating
detention for most noncitizens with criminal histories.89
This historical focus on criminality and exclusion only intensified
with the dissolution of the INS and creation of ICE. The agency saw
itself as having been forged “from the crucible of the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001,”90 and “[e]stablished to combat the criminal
and national security threats emergent in a post 9/11 environment.”91
Its self-described “vision statement” was “[t]o be the nation’s
Rabin, supra note 13, at 216-26.
Cornelius D. Scully, Reorganizing the Administration of the Immigration Laws:
Recommendations and Historical Context, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 937, 939 (1998).
87. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 70-106 O, HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1 (1980).
88. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
131-246 (2007).
89. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1843-48 (2007)
(arguing that the expansion of criminal grounds for removal in 1996, along with increased
criminal prosecution for immigration offenses, “have shored up the popular construction of
immigrants as criminal threats”); Morawetz, supra note 29 (explaining the impact of
immigration legislation in 1996 on noncitizens with criminal history); Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 419
(2006) (“When noncitizens are classified as criminals, expulsion presents itself as the natural
solution. The individual’s stake in the U.S. community, such as family ties, employment,
contribution to the community, and whether the noncitizen has spent a majority of his lifetime
in the United States, becomes secondary to the perceived need to protect the community.”
(footnote omitted)).
90. See, e.g., ICE, ICE: Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Report, CHESAPEAKE DIGITAL
PRESERVATION GROUP 2, http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901
coll4/id/2168 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
91. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Mission, U.S. DIPLOMATIC
MISSION TO BRAZ., http://brazil.usembassy.gov/sections-offices/immigration-and-customsenforcement.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
85.
86.
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preeminent law enforcement agency, dedicated to detecting
vulnerabilities and preventing violations that threaten national
security.”92
Time and again ICE has emphasized its security mission. In
press releases, budget reports, and public addresses, the agency has
described its role “to protect America and uphold public safety by
targeting the people, money and materials that support terrorist and
criminal activities.”93 Explaining the Secure Communities program in
2011, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano stated that DHS “established,
as a top priority, the identification and removal of public safety and
national security threats.”94 ICE’s current website states that its mission
is to “promote homeland security and public safety through the
criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border
control, customs, trade and immigration.”95
ICE trial attorneys are thus tasked with “protect[ing] the
homeland by diligently litigating cases.”96 They work within an agency
culture with deeply rooted emphasis on enforcement that intensified
following Congress’s bureaucratic restructuring in response to the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. It is not surprising, then, to hear one chief
counsel in charge of a regional ICE office describe himself as a “child
of 9/11” and explain that the terrorist attack was his motivation to
become an immigration prosecutor.97
2.

Ministers of Justice

Although their role as guardians of the nation’s safety through
diligent enforcement of immigration law presents a crucial duty, ICE
92. Id.; see also ICE Unveils “Most Wanted” Criminal Aliens List, ILW.COM (May
14, 2003), http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/News/2003,0516-alienlist.shtm (“ICE is
committed to ensuring the safety of the American public. Reducing the number of dangerous
criminal aliens hiding in this country is a crucial part of that mission.”).
93. See, e.g., ICE, supra note 90, at 2; Immigration Enforcement: The Rhetoric, the
Reality, TRAC (May 28, 2007), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/178/ (reporting, for
example, former Assistant Secretary of ICE Julie Myers’ address to a conference of
immigration lawyers in 2007).
94. Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement, DHS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/05/
secretary-napolitanos-remarks-smart-effective-border-security-and-immigration.
95. Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (expand the “What We Do”
heading) (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
96. Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/
offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
97. Betsy Cavendish & Steven Schulman, Reimagining the Immigration Court
Assembly Line, APPLESEED 40 (2012), http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/03/Reimagining-the-Immigration-Court-Assembly-Line.pdf.
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attorneys have additional responsibilities imposed by Congress, courts,
and key agency overseers. Put broadly, trial attorneys are not afforded
the convenience of merely seeking to win every removal case that
comes before them in immigration court. Instead, they are also “dutybound to ‘cut square corners’ and seek justice rather than victory.”98
This obligation is similar to that of prosecutors in the criminal system,
who may not single-mindedly seek convictions, but must be “ministers
of justice.”99
While private practitioners are permitted or even encouraged to
advance their private client’s (lawful) objectives through any means
short of illegal or ethically proscribed conduct,100 government attorneys
are generally expected to be constrained from no-holds-barred
advocacy, given their special obligations as both members of and
representatives for the government. 101 Because they represent a
“sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all,”102 government attorneys are said to
have a professional responsibility to seek justice.103
The concept that government attorneys have a duty to seek justice
in the context of removal proceedings is not merely an abstract ideal.
98. Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Reid v. INS,
949 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir. 1991) (commending the INS’s attorney for admitting error in light
of the principle that “[c]ounsel for the government has an interest only in the law being
observed, not in victory or defeat in any particular litigation”); In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec.
722, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (“[I]mmigration enforcement obligations do not consist only of
initiating and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has
been said, the government wins when justice is done.”).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013) (“A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); see Bruce A.
Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612-18 (1999).
100. See Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations that Follow
from Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty To Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS
L.J. 13, 18 (2003).
101. See Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil
Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 238, 265-67 (2000).
102. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
103. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 81, at 8-9 (summarizing the judicial
sentiment that enforcement discretion is an executive function essential to the “proper
administration of justice”); Berenson, supra note 100, at 17-31; Green, supra note 101, at
237-38, 256-79; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980) (“A
government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from
instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A government lawyer not having
such discretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy submitted to
him should so advise his superiors and recommend the avoidance of unfair litigation. A
government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek
justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he should not use his position or the
economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or
results.”).
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Rather, a variety of legal sources—statutory provisions, training
materials, agency memoranda, and case law—charge trial attorneys
with this responsibility. Moreover, their responsibility to help the
system achieve justice is multifaceted, thus confirming its breadth and
depth. This Subpart sketches the origins and contours of three
minimal components of the minister-of-justice duty: legitimate
objectives, procedural fairness, and equitable discretion.
First, trial attorneys may pursue only lawful objectives through
immigration enforcement actions. Most obviously, ICE may not seek
to remove U.S. citizens, because statutory deportation laws apply only
to “aliens.”104 In the wake of erroneous removals of citizens,105 ICE
officials have emphasized to Congress and the public that its agents
are trained on the responsibility to avoid such mistakes.106 Such
guidance includes an agency memorandum instructing ICE to “fully
investigate the merits of any claim to citizenship made by an individual
who is subject to a Notice to Appear.”107 Appropriate measures may
include searching vital records and interviewing family members.108
Even where citizenship is not at issue, trial attorneys have no
legitimate interest in “deporting those who are not deportable, or in

104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
(considering a derivative citizenship claim that would defeat the government’s attempt to
deport a person with a criminal record).
105. See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and
Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011) (discussing the
erroneous detention and deportation of U.S. citizens); William Finnegan, The Deportation
Machine, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/
the-deportation-machine (same); Ice Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent
Residents, TRAC (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/311 (showing
that data provided by ICE indicated that 834 ICE detainers were issued against U.S. citizens
between FY2008 and FY2012); Ted Robbins, In the Rush To Deport, Expelling U.S. Citizens,
NPR (Oct. 24, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141500145/in-the-rush-todeport-expelling-u-s-citizens (discussing the erroneous detention and deportation of U.S.
citizens); see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DIASPORA 14-15, 99-102 (2012).
106. See, e.g., Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention and Removal Procedures:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l
Law, 110th Cong. 110-80 (2008) (statement of Gary E. Mead, Deputy Director, Office of
Detention & Removal Operations, ICE, DHS).
107. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, ICE, to Field Office Directors,
Special Agents in Charge, Chief Counsels, ICE, ICE 2-3 (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/reporting-investigating-us-citizen-claims.pdf; see also
SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, OFFICE MANUAL 119-23 (Jan. 8, 2014)
(providing trial attorneys with detailed guidance on the duty to investigate claims to U.S.
citizenship) (on file with author).
108. Memorandum from John Morton to Field Office Directors, supra note 107.
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barring from discretionary relief those who are eligible.”109 ICE’s
policy for facilitating the return of noncitizens who prevail on appeal
after being deported reflects the agency’s commitment to seeking only
legitimate removals.110 According to Professor David Martin, former
general counsel to both DHS and the INS, trial attorneys are trained to
probe a respondent’s claims but are expected to support adjudicatory
relief from removal if persuaded of the credibility and legal merit of
the noncitizen’s account. 111 Likewise, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) has emphasized trial attorneys’ shared obligation to
ensure that the United States in fact offers refuge to persons seeking
asylum in immigration court when warranted under applicable law.112
Second, ICE prosecutors must promote procedural justice. An
ICE attorney is “the representative of a government dedicated to
fairness and equal justice to all and, in this respect, he owes a heavy
obligation to [his adversary].”113 Training materials for trial attorneys
have long established that respondents should be aided in obtaining
any procedural rights or benefits required by the controlling statutes,
regulations, and court decisions, or by the requirements of fairness.114
The immigration statute provides that a noncitizen charged with
overcoming potential grounds of inadmissibility “shall have access to
the alien’s visa or other entry document, if any, and any other records
and documents, not considered by the Attorney General to be
confidential, pertaining to the alien’s admission or presence in the
109. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality,
Finality, and the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 191-92 (2010).
110. See John Morton, 11061.1: Facilitating the Return to the United States of Certain
Lawfully Removed Aliens, ICE (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_
memos/11061.1_current_policy_facilitating_return.pdf.
111. E-mail from David A. Martin, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to
Immigration Law Professors List (Sept. 7, 2013, 1:47 PM) (on file with author) (“As INS
General Counsel, I often emphasized in such settings that attorneys were expected to ask
serious questions in immigration court to probe a person’s narrative and also to clarify details,
but at the end of that process, if persuaded of the account (and its legal merit), the attorney
should indicate that the government supports or would have no objection to the grant of relief
(asylum, cancellation, etc.).”).
112. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (“Because this Board,
the Immigration Judges, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are all bound to
uphold this law, we all bear the responsibility of ensuring that refugee protection is provided
where such protection is warranted by the circumstances of an asylum applicant’s claim.”).
113. Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Handford v.
United States, 249 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1958)).
114. See, e.g., In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 737 (referring to agency training
material); SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note 107, at 129-32
(instructing that trial attorneys must turn over evidence in their possession bearing on the
noncitizen’s mental incompetence to ensure that the immigration judge can evaluate whether
counsel should be appointed as required by the BIA).
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United States.”115 A related provision requires that noncitizens in
immigration court be given “a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence” against them.116 While the full extent of the government’s
disclosure requirements under these provisions is contested, at least
one federal court of appeals has held that they create a “mandatory
access” rule, generally requiring the government to turn over any
helpful records possessed in the noncitizen’s A-file.117 In the context of
asylum adjudications, the BIA has similarly indicated its expectation
that government attorneys, who often have significantly greater
resources and access to information, will independently introduce
evidence bearing on the merits of noncitizens’ claims.118
Finally, ICE attorneys’ role as ministers of justice requires them
to exercise equitable discretion.119 As described by William Howard,
former ICE Principal Legal Advisor, in a memorandum to agency
attorneys:
Prosecutorial discretion is a very significant tool that sometimes
enables you to deal with the difficult, complex and contradictory
provisions of the immigration laws and cases involving human
suffering and hardship. . . . Our reasoned determination in making
prosecutorial discretion decisions can be a significant benefit to the
120
efficiency and fairness of the removal process.

In the context of immigration court, prosecutorial discretion most
often refers to the agency’s authority to decide not to seek a removal
order against someone suspected to be present in violation of
immigration laws.121 Although the agency has worked under internal
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2012).
116. Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
117. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We construe the ‘shall
have access’ statute to provide a rule for removal proceedings . . . . We are unable to imagine
a good reason for not producing the A-file routinely without a request, but another case may
address that issue when facts call for it.”). As discussed further below, many ICE attorneys
have resisted the holding in Dent, and other circuits have yet to reach the issue. See
discussion infra Part III.C.
118. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726-27 (B.I.A. 1997); see also id. at 737-39
(Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring) (noting frequent information asymmetries between
asylum applicants and the government and concluding that “as the majority explains, the
Service should present any evidence it has, supporting or contradicting the applicant’s asylum
claim”).
119. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 81, at 8-9 (summarizing the judicial
sentiment that enforcement discretion is an executive function essential to the “proper
administration of justice”).
120. Memorandum from William J. Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal
Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27, at 8.
121. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, to Regional
Directors, District Directors, Chief Patrol Agents, Regional and District Counsel, INS, LEGAL
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policies with respect to prosecutorial discretion since at least the
1970s,122 in recent years ICE policy leaders have issued a series of
memoranda expanding on earlier guidance and making the exercise of
discretion more publically transparent.123 Of particular relevance here,
the agency has emphasized its expectation that trial attorneys consider
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in all immigration removal
proceedings, 124 paying special attention to cases not yet filed or
appearing on the master calendar.125
As expressed in these memoranda, the agency’s prosecutorial
discretion policies reflect two, often overlapping, goals. One is to
conserve scarce agency resources by declining or deferring cases that
are low priorities, either because the person is likely to prevail anyway
or because his or her criminal history or immigration violations are
minor.126 The other objective is to ensure that ICE attorneys take
special account of situations in which noncitizens are technically in
violation of civil immigration laws but have strong humanitarian
factors militating in favor of discretion.127
In prior work, I advanced an additional argument supporting the
exercise of discretion in removal proceedings where there have been

ACTION CENTER 2 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/
lac/Meissner-2000-memo.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976).
123. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office
Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, ICE, ICE (June 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf.
124. Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 3, at 3.
125. Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All Chief
Counsel, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, ICE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.ice.
gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pendingcases-memorandum.pdf; Next Steps in the Implementation of the Prosecutorial Discretion
Memorandum and the August 18th Announcement on Immigration Enforcement Priorities,
ICE, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2014); see also SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note
107, at 133 (instructing trial attorneys to confirm that individual cases are priorities for
enforcement before recalendaring cases that had been closed before the Supreme Court
clarified that its ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky was not retroactive).
126. Guidance to ICE Attorneys Reviewing the CBP, USCIS, and ICE Cases Before
the Executive Office for Immigration Review, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorialdiscretion/guidance-to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf (last visited
Oct. 31, 2014); Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 3.
127. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Directors, Special
Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel, ICE, ICE (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum from William J.
Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27.
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violations of noncitizens’ constitutional rights by arresting officers.128
Drawing on the work of Lawrence Sager and others, 129 I contend that
ICE attorneys have a constitutional responsibility to take remedial
actions in light of the judiciary decision to underenforce violations of
the Fourth Amendment in removal proceedings.130 The crux of the
argument is that the judiciary’s self-imposed institutional limitations on
constitutional enforcement do not limit the strength of the constitutional norm itself. Accordingly, “where institutional factors inhibit
robust judicial guardianship of the Constitution, the executive branch’s
obligation to ensure full enforcement is actually elevated.” 131 In
removal proceedings, this arguably provides another source of the trial
attorneys’ obligation to see justice done in certain situations.
As in other areas of government-enforced benefits and sanctions,
officials charged with administering immigration law are expected “to
be at least open to the possibility that a special case is presenting
itself.”132 Indeed, many of the same congresspersons who enacted
harsh and restrictive amendments to the immigration statute in the
1990s expressed surprise and disappointment when it came to light
that the INS was enforcing those laws in cases where removal was
“unfair and resulted in unjustifiable hardship.”133 They urged the
Attorney General and INS Commissioner to employ prosecutorial
discretion more systematically.134 In Arizona v. United States, the

128. Cade, supra note 11.
129. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84-92 (2004); Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth
Amendment: The Prosecutor’s Role, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591 (2014); Lawrence Gene
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1220-21 (1978); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 128-30 (1993) (explaining that “constitutional law, as developed by
the Supreme Court, reflects in part the Court’s views of its own institutional capacities” and
accordingly might differ from constitutional interpretation by the Executive Branch).
130. Cade, supra note 11, at 187-98.
131. Id. at 192; see also SAGER, supra note 129, at 88, 91-94, 116 (discussing the
underenforcement thesis); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive
Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1225 (2006) (stating that when the judiciary is unable to
fully enforce a constitutional provision, the executive branch bears the burden of enforcing
the provision more fully); Sager, supra note 129, at 1226-28 (discussing the obligation of
public officials to use “best efforts” to avoid unconstitutional conduct).
132. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at xii.
133. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 30, at 780 (quoting Letter from Henry J. Hyde et
al., Representatives, U.S. Cong., to Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, & Doris M.
Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 4, 1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
134. Id.
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Supreme Court highlighted the central role that discretion plays in the
removal system:
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate
human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their
families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or
aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case
may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children
born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of
distinguished military service. . . . Returning an alien to his own
country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a
135
removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.

Underlying the importance of each component of ICE
prosecutors’ duty to see justice done is the significant hardship that
immigration detention and deportation inflicts on noncitizens and their
families and communities, as well as on the public fisc. The logjam in
underresourced immigration courts produces adjudicative wait times
that nationally average over 500 days, greatly prolonging the
disruption and expense of fighting removal proceedings.136 As alluded
to above,137 laws enacted in the 1990s made civil detention mandatory
for a wide variety of immigration offenses, and many other persons are
subject to discretionary detention on the basis of the government’s
immigration charges.138 In FY2012, 400,000 people were subject to
135. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (citations omitted); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (“[A]t the time IIRIRA was enacted the
INS had been engaging in a regular practice (which had come to be known as ‘deferred
action’) of exercising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own
convenience.”).
136. Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC (Aug. 2014), http://trac.
syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outcome.php (select “Average
Days” under the “What to Tabulate” heading) (showing 506 average days to completion in all
immigration court cases in FY2014). For individuals ultimately granted adjudicative relief
from removal in FY2014, the average wait time was 867 days. Id.
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.
138. Many asylum seekers, for example, and most persons charged with any criminal
grounds of removal are detained in prison-like conditions for part or all of the pendency of
proceedings. See Jails and Jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention
System—A Two-Year Review, HUM. RTS. FIRST 1-9 (2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf (describing the conditions of
immigration detention); Tortured & Detained: Survivor Stories of U.S. Immigration
Detention, CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE 5 (Nov. 2013), http://www.cvt.org/sites/cvt.org/
files/Report_TorturedAndDetained_Nov2013.pdf (“[F]rom October 2010 to February
2013—the United States detained approximately 6,000 survivors of torture as they were
seeking asylum protection.”). The average length of detention for all persons in removal
proceedings is 30 days, while the average length of stay for detained asylum seekers is 102.4
days. Jails and Jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention System—A TwoYear Review, supra, at 13.
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civil immigration incarceration, at a cost of $2 billion.139 For many,
there is no right or privilege more important than remaining in this
country, and no sanction worse than deportation.140 The impact of
deportation on those a deportee leaves behind can be severe.141 By any
measure, then, the immigration system administers benefits and
sanctions of substantial significance, at great expense to taxpayers.
Accordingly, ICE trial attorneys’ role as ministers of justice is critically
important.
III. PROBLEMS: DISCRETIONARY DISPARITIES, UNWARRANTED
DETENTIONS AND REMOVALS, AND OVERZEALOUS TACTICS
As described in Part II, ICE prosecutors shoulder significant
responsibilities. The enforcement of immigration laws to keep the
nation safe is a critical agency objective, especially in the wake of the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. At the same time, however, trial attorneys
must exercise discretion in ways that avoid wrongful removals and
procedures, prioritize scarce resources, and take into account
“immediate human concerns” when warranted by the equities.142
As in all large organizations, especially those with multiple
objectives, there is significant variation in how ICE trial attorneys
perceive their role and carry out their work. Some are conscientious,
principled, and reasonable; others are lazy, opportunistic, or
139. John F. Simanski & Lesley M. Sapp, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2012,
DHS 1 (Dec. 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_
2012_1.pdf; U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report: Fiscal
Years 2011-2013, DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-congressional-budgetjustification-fy2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). From 1994 to 2011, the number of
persons held in civil immigration detention increased an astonishing 430%. See Mary Fan,
The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 127-28 (2013).
140. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
322-23 (2001); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947); Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); see also Pilcher, supra note 40, at 270 (arguing that immigration
proceedings primarily impact “the trappings of identity: home, family, community, and self,
resulting in ‘loss of both property and life; or all that makes life worth living’” (quoting Ng
Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284)).
141. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 105, at 135-45 (describing the hardship
wrought by deportation on individuals, families, and communities); KANSTROOM, supra note
88, at 10 (“The 1996 laws have been severely criticized for the devastation they have wrought
on families, for their rigidity, and for their retroactivity.”); Forced Apart: Families Separated
and Immigrants Harmed by United States Deportation Policy, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0707_web.pdf; Seth Freed Wessler, Shattered

Families: The Perilous Intersection of Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare
System, RACE FORWARD (Nov. 2011), http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/sites/default/
files/uploads/ARC_Report_Shattered_Families_FULL_REPORT_NOV2011Release.pdf.
142. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
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overzealous. My aim here is not to define ICE “culture,” much less to
suggest that agency attorneys are less principled than lawyers working
in other fields. But I do seek to show that, whatever the reason may
be, serious problems mark the on-the-ground handling of immigration
cases by ICE. Two problems are of dominating importance. First, the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion within ICE appears to be highly
inconsistent across the country, leading to disparate application of the
agency’s priorities for removal. Second, many ICE attorneys fail to
implement their obligations fully to ensure procedural fairness and
avoid unwarranted detentions or removal proceedings in the handling
of individual immigration cases.

A. Inconsistent Use of Prosecutorial Discretion
As alluded to above, on June 17, 2011, ICE Director John
Morton began ramping up an agency-wide initiative to encourage a
more systematic use of prosecutorial discretion.143 Through a series of
memoranda setting forth positive and negative factors to be balanced
in the exercise of discretion and designating categories of persons
warranting special consideration, Morton hoped to reduce the
tremendous backlog plaguing the immigration courts, focus the
agency’s limited resources on high priority targets, and make the
deportation system as humane as possible.144 Morton emphasized his
expectation that, even more so than in the past, trial attorneys would
evaluate all individual removal proceedings for the possible exercise of
discretion.
The prosecutorial discretion initiative got off to a rocky start.
Four months after the issuance of Director Morton’s June 17
memoranda, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)
collected 252 case submissions from immigration practitioners in

143. Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 3.
144. Id.; see also Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., Peter S. Vincent,
Principal Legal Advisor, and James Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., ICE, to All Field Office
Directors, Chief Counsel, and Special Agents in Charge, ICE, IMMIGR. EQUALITY,
http://www.immigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/PD-memo-10-5-2012-2.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (“As the Prosecutorial Discretion Memorandum makes clear, one
of the factors relevant to that assessment is ‘the person’s ties and contributions to the
community, including family relationships.’”); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to
All Employees, ICE, ICE (June 15, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/
s1-certain-young-people-morton.pdf; Memorandum from John Morton to All Field Office
Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, supra note 123, at 1-2.
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virtually every jurisdiction.145 The thrust of the feedback was that trial
attorneys had not altered their discretionary practices in any
meaningful regard.146 The report provided detailed examples from
each jurisdiction, which were summarized as follows:
While practices have improved in a few ICE offices, in the majority of
offices ICE agents, trial attorneys and supervisors admitted that they
had not implemented the memoranda and there had been no changes in
policy or practice. Many called for additional guidance or instruction
from headquarters while others felt that they were already exercising
discretion sufficiently. Several said they have no intention of
complying and indicated their jobs are to arrest and deport people. A
few ICE attorneys expressed concern about changing current practice
for fear that it would negatively impact their careers. . . . Equally
troublesome, ICE offices are inconsistently interpreting the
prosecutorial discretion standards set forth in the June memoranda.
Many ICE offices described the criteria in more narrow terms than the
memoranda, and some even refused to consider whole categories of
147
cases no matter the equities.

These accounts from practitioners in the field are supported by data
later obtained by researchers at Syracuse University, which indicated
that throughout the country, ICE prosecutors closed only thirteen cases
in the exercise of discretion between June and December of 2011.148
On the heels of this inauspicious beginning, ICE issued three
additional documents on November 17, 2011, which detailed more
comprehensively the agency’s motivation for reviewing cases and
specifically ordered the review of all nondetained cases in two pilot
jurisdictions. In addition, these pronouncements called for scenariobased training programs for all ICE attorneys and offered special
guidance regarding cases that warranted especially strong reasons for
the exercise of prosecutorial leniency.149 Over time, the agency’s
training sessions, guidance documents, and working-group reviews
145. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Holding DHS Accountable on Prosecutorial
Discretion, ELMORE & PETERSON (Nov. 2011), http://elmoreattorneys.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/11/AILA-AIC-Pros-Disc-Report-11.21.11.pdf.
146. Id. at 4.
147. Id.
148. ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Program, TRAC tbl.1 (July 23, 2012), http://trac.syr.
edu/immigration/reports/287/.
149. See Guidance to ICE Attorneys Reviewing the CBP, USCIS, and ICE Cases
Before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, supra note 126; Memorandum from
Peter S. Vincent to All Chief Counsel, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, supra note 125;

Next Steps in the Implementation of the Prosecutorial Discretion Memorandum and the
August 18th Announcement on Immigration Enforcement Priorities, supra note 125.
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have gradually increased discretionary case closures.150 In the year
following the issuance of the Morton memos, ICE prosecutors closed a
total of 5,684 cases nationwide—about 1.9% of the pending cases.151
As of August 31, 2014, the total number of closed cases based on
prosecutorial discretion reached 38,439 (6.8% of all cases closed since
October 2012).152 This number, while considerably lower than many
expected, is not negligible. It has been insufficient, however, to reduce
the overall workload, as the number of cases pending nationwide in
immigration courts reached a new high of 408,073 as of August
2014.153
Even more importantly, the national figures do not tell a critical
part of the story: case closures based on prosecutorial discretion vary
dramatically across jurisdictions. Data secured through Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests reveals that, as of August 31, 2014,
just five of the nation’s sixty courts154 were responsible for over half of
the total number of immigration case closures.155 Widening the scope
slightly shows that discretionary closures by ICE attorneys in ten
courts comprise roughly 70% of such closures nationwide.156 On the
other side of the coin, in scores of hearing locations, trial attorneys
almost never exercise prosecutorial discretion, with total case closures
since Morton’s initiative began in the single digits.157

150. Historic Drop in Deportation Orders Continues as Immigration Court Backlog
Increases, TRAC (Apr. 24, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/279; ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Program, supra note 148.
151. ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Program, supra note 148, tbl.1; Meghan McCarthy,
‘Prosecutorial Discretion’ Barely Dents Immigration Case Backlog, TUCSONSENTINEL.COM
(July 15, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/071512_immig_
cases/prosecutorial-discretion-barely-dents-immigration-case-backlog/.
152. Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial Discretion, TRAC (Aug.
31, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/prosdiscretion/.
153. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC (Aug. 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/php
tools/immigration/court_backlog/.
154. EOIR Immigration Court Listing, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/
ICadr.htm (last updated Sept. 2014).
155. Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note
152 (showing that as of August 31, 2014, there were 19,177 closures based on prosecutorial
discretion in Los Angeles, Charlotte, Seattle, San Francisco, and New York City, out of a total
of 38,439 closures nationwide).
156. Id. (showing that as of August 31, 2014, there were 26,999 closures based on
prosecutorial discretion in Los Angeles, Charlotte, Seattle, San Francisco, New York City,
Orlando, Miami, Phoenix, San Diego, Omaha, and Memphis, out of a total of 38,439 closures
nationwide).
157. Id.
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The discretionary closure data suggests significant disparities
between many courts with similarly sized dockets.158 For example, as
of August 31, 2014, trial attorneys in Charlotte’s and Seattle’s small
immigration courts have closed more than 2,000 cases each in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which was more than 20% of all
case resolutions since October 2012 in their respective courts.159 Their
counterparts in comparable Phoenix, Omaha, and Memphis have
closed more than 1,000 cases each, while trial attorneys in Las Vegas,
Houston, and Hartford have discontinued prosecutions in 171 or fewer
cases.160 The contrast between courts with larger dockets is similarly
stark. In San Diego and Orlando, trial attorneys have closed 1,300 or
more cases in the exercise of discretion.161 In Atlanta and Boston the
number drops to 982 and 747, respectively, while in Newark and
Dallas discretionary closures are at 466 and 376, respectively.162 There
are also significant differences in discretionary closures between the
country’s largest immigration courts: as of August 31, 2014, ICE
prosecutors in Los Angeles exercised discretion to close cases in
11,108 cases, while New York City saw only 1,750 cases closed in the
same time period.163
In short, the data suggests that while some trial attorneys take
seriously the responsibility of equitable prosecutorial discretion, others
seem to regard it as optional or nonexistent. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to isolate all the potential variables affecting ICE’s
discretionary closures in immigration court.164 But the differences are
pronounced and numerous enough to conclude that, at the least, the
checkerboard implementation of the prosecutorial discretion initiative
158. For purposes of roughly estimating the size of each court’s docket, I am using the
number of immigration judges EOIR has assigned to that court.
159. Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note
152.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Alternative explanations for some of the results are conceivable. For example,
trial attorneys working in field offices located in “new-destination” locations—those with
large numbers of recently arrived immigrants—might theoretically encounter fewer
noncitizens presenting strong family and community ties than trial attorneys whose
jurisdiction includes long-established immigrant communities. Or, as suggested by one ICE
attorney with whom I spoke, perhaps CBP does a better job in some areas of targeting high
priority immigrants for arrest, and for that or other reasons NTAs are not often filed in cases
that would warrant discretion. See Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern
Office, supra note 76. These theories might explain slight differences in discretionary
closures, but are not persuasive enough to account for the magnitude of prosecutorial
discretion discrepancies across so many similar hearing locations.
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reflects unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals who find
themselves caught—sometimes improperly—in the workings of the
nation’s deportation machinery.
When trial attorneys do employ prosecutorial discretion, the
timing and conditions often approximate plea-bargaining in the
criminal system. According to numerous anecdotal reports from
advocates, ICE prosecutors around the country frequently offer to
close those cases in which noncitizens appear to be eligible for some
kind of adjudicative relief from deportation, such as cancellation of
removal or asylum.165 Advocates report that prosecutors often present
the discretionary closure offer as a “one-bite-at-the-apple” deal, at or
just before the hearing, and with a demand for an immediate answer.166
In addition, the form of prosecutorial discretion offered is almost
invariably administrative closure, rather than termination without
prejudice or “deferred action.” 167 But noncitizens who receive
administrative closure generally cannot apply for work authorization168
or recover their bond money, which averages almost $6,000
165. See Administrative Closure and Advanced Parole E-mail Posts to Immigration
Clinical Professor’s List (Apr. 2014) (on file with author) (relating anecdotes from
immigration clinicians in New York City, Chicago, and Iowa regarding the prevalence of ICE
attorneys offering prosecutorial discretion in meritorious or strong asylum cases); see N.Y.
Immigration Coal. & N.Y. Cnty. Lawyer’s Ass’n, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: How the
Prosecutorial Discretion Policy Failed To Keep Its Promise, N.Y. IMMIGR. COALITION 14 (Jan.
2013), http://www.thenyic.org/sites/default/files/Prosecutorial%20Indiscretion%201-10-Final.
pdf (“Our data also showed that ICE frequently offered an exercise of discretion to
individuals who appeared likely to win their immigration cases and obtain more lasting forms
of relief . . . .”); Prosecutorial Discretion: A Statistical Assessment, IMMIGR. POL’Y CENTER 3
(June 11, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/prosecutorial-discretion-statisticalanalysis (“DHS sources have said that of the 3,998 immigrants who have declined offers of
administrative closure, more than 3,000 may be eligible for ‘cancellation of removal’ . . . .”);
Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation: Synthesis of Chapter Reports, AILA 3-5,
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=38125 (last updated Jan. 31, 2012).
166. Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation: Synthesis of Chapter Reports, supra
note 165, at 2-4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Administrative Closure and
Advanced Parole Posts to Immigration Clinical Professor’s List, supra note 165 (including an
e-mail from Geoffrey Heeren, Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of
Law, on April 2, 2014, regarding an incident in which the ICE attorney offered administrative
closure to his client just before the asylum hearing began and gave him only ten minutes to
decide).
167. Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation: Synthesis of Chapter Reports, supra
note 165, at 6-8.
168. Noncitizens who benefit from a form of enforcement discretion called deferred
action are eligible to apply for work authorization, but administrative closure does not require
ICE to offer deferred action. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014). See generally 6 CHARLES
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 72.03[2][h] (2014) (describing deferred action as a form of administrative
discretionary relief from deportation at various stages of immigration proceedings).

34

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1

nationwide.169 As a result, they often face the difficult choice of
accepting uncertain respite and losing substantial funds or facing ICE
in an adversarial proceeding subject to informational disparities.170 In
short, some trial attorneys primarily use discretionary closure not to
buffer overly harsh applications of immigration law in low-priority
cases, but rather to avoid having to litigate hearings when the
noncitizen may be eligible for more far-reaching relief.

B.

Erroneous Charges

The government’s most egregious errors in the context of removal
proceedings involve the detention and deportation of U.S. citizens. It
is unclear how many citizens are subjected to immigration proceedings
each year, but the number is not insignificant. 171 The Florence
Immigration and Refugee Rights Project has estimated that each
month, forty or fifty local detainees present facially valid claims to
U.S. citizenship.172 Political scientist Jacqueline Stevens has estimated
that approximately 1% of detained persons charged with removability
have eventually been found to be U.S. citizens and that another .05%
of those already deported from the country have U.S. citizenship.173 As
Professor Daniel Kanstroom has observed, if Stevens is correct, then

169. Jailed Without Justice: Immigration Detention in the USA, AMNESTY INT’L 1719, http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014)
(reporting that the national average for immigration bonds is $5,941); Peter L. Markowitz et
al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration
Proceedings, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 13 (Dec. 2011), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/
content/denovo/NYIRS_Report.pdf (reporting that judges in New York set immigration
bonds at an average of $10,000, despite being authorized to release many individuals on their
own recognizance or to set bail as low as $1,500); Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation:
Synthesis of Chapter Reports, supra note 165, at 8.
170. See infra Part III.C (discussing discovery asymmetries in immigration courts);
see also Administrative Closure and Advanced Parole E-mail Posts to Immigration Clinical
Professor’s List, supra note 165.
171. See, e.g., Andrew Becker & Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Citizens Caught Up in
Immigration Sweeps, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/
nation/na-citizen9; Tyche Hendricks, Suits for Wrongful Deportation by ICE Rise, S.F. GATE
(July 28, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Suits-for-wrongful-deporta
tion-by-ICE-rise-3291314.php (reporting on hundreds of U.S. citizens subjected to detention
and deportation proceedings).
172. See Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 37 (2008) (testimony of Kara Hartzler,
Esq., Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project).
173. Stevens, supra note 105, at 622, 624; see Jacqueline Stevens, Thin ICE, NATION
(June 5, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/thin-ice.
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ICE may have held as many as 20,000 U.S. citizens in detention since
2003 and actually deported thousands of them.174
Noncitizens are also subjected to erroneous removal actions. In
some cases, the charging document alleges grounds for removability
that are not justified by the noncitizen’s conduct. As mentioned, trial
attorneys often do not make the decision to file the NTA or the initial
determination of which charges to allege. They always have the
authority, however, to amend the grounds of removability, and revised
charges are often filed. Yet little constrains trial attorneys from
proceeding with erroneous or overblown allegations.175
Moncrieffe v. Holder presents a recent example of government
overcharging.176 In Adrian Moncrieffe’s removal proceedings, ICE
alleged that a low-level drug offense, criminalizing both social sharing
of a small amount of marijuana and distribution for remuneration,
should presumptively be considered an aggravated felony, thereby
rendering Moncrieffe not only deportable but also ineligible for
discretionary relief and subject to mandatory detention. The Supreme
Court ultimately rejected the government’s position, noting: “This is
the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the
Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as
‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated
felony.’ Once again we hold that the Government’s approach defies
‘the commonsense conception’ of these terms.”177
Similarly, in Leocal v. Ashcroft, the government alleged that
Josue Leocal’s DUI conviction was a crime of violence, making him
deportable as an aggravated felon.178 When the case eventually reached
the Supreme Court—after Leocal had already been deported to
Haiti—Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous
Court, completely rejected the government’s position, finding the
174. KANSTROOM, supra note 105, at 100.
175. To File or Not To File a Notice To Appear: Improving the Government’s Use of
Prosecutorial Discretion, PENN ST. L. 51-52 (Oct. 2013), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/
default/files/documents/pdfs/NTAReportFinal.pdf (quoting retired Immigration Judge Bruce
Einhorn).
176. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
177. Id. at 1693 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (rejecting ICE’s position that a second simple drug possession
offense constitutes an aggravated felony where the second conviction was not based on the
fact of a prior conviction); Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (rejecting the government’s
argument that a drug possession conviction punishable as a misdemeanor under federal law
qualifies as an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony if punishable as a felony under state
law).
178. 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
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question not even close. 179 Other federal courts have noted the
government’s tendency to stretch legal arguments when attempting to
remove noncitizens it believes are undesirable.180
Most of the cases in which ICE loses on the merits of
removability never reach the federal courts. But in fact, data recently
obtained through the FOIA shows that in recent years, immigration
judges ultimately reject ICE’s request for a removal order almost 50%
of the time181—up from an already high rejection of one of every four
cases from FY2001 to FY2010. 182 While there may be reasons
immigration judges terminate cases that would not signal prosecutorial
missteps, the 50% figure suggests that in many cases ICE proceeds on
inaccurate charges or should not be pursuing deportation at all. By
way of a very rough comparison, only one out of ten federal criminal
prosecutions did not end in a conviction in 2009.183 The contrast is
even starker when one considers that the government’s burden of proof
in civil immigration cases is considerably lower than in criminal
prosecutions,184 and the fact that immigration judges—themselves DOJ
lawyers—are frequently the subject of criticism for abuses and
enforcement biases.185 Every year the BIA reverses and remands

179. Id. at 11.
180. See, e.g., Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In other
words, the government’s position is that the word ‘legitimation’ should be read broadly when
a broad reading results in the denial of citizenship, and narrowly when a narrow reading
results in the denial of citizenship.”).
181. ICE Targeting: Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported by Immigration Judge,
TRAC (Aug. 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_outcome_
leave.php.
182. Id.; see also ICE Seeks To Deport the Wrong People, TRAC fig.1 & accompanying tabular data (Nov. 9, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/ (stating that the
rejection rate for ICE removal requests increased to 31%).
183. See Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 2 (Dec.
2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf. Note, however, the win-loss statistics
on formal removal orders do not include the over 100,000 expedited removals that occur
outside of formal immigration courts each year. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (2012) (certain
arriving aliens seeking admission are subject to expedited removal procedures); Simanski &
Sapp, supra note 139, at 5 tbl.6.
184. See discussion supra Part II.B.
185. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 71, at 1675 (citing opinions by courts of appeals
criticizing immigration judges for “incompetence, bias, hostility, intimidation, abuse, and
other unprofessional conduct”); Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, NATION (Oct. 20, 2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/155497/lawless-courts (describing unprofessional, abusive,
and potentially unethical conduct by immigration judges); see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al.,
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007)
(showing significant disparities in the adjudication of asylum for similarly situated individuals across and within immigration courts).
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thousands of immigration judges’ decisions on the merits that went in
favor of DHS.186
Although some noncitizens prevail, charging decisions can affect
the outcome of removal proceedings. As mentioned, almost all
criminal grounds of removal trigger mandatory detention.187 Some
studies have demonstrated that civil detention impedes a noncitizen’s
chance of success in removal proceedings, as does a lack of legal
representation.188 In New York’s immigration courts, for example, 74%
of nondetained, represented noncitizens were successful. 189 The
success rate dropped to 18% for represented noncitizens held in
detention, while only 3% of detained noncitizens without counsel
avoided removal.190 Other data supports the influence of detention on
immigration court outcomes.191
Detainees have more difficulty winning cases for multiple
reasons. To be sure, a larger percentage of detained noncitizens will
have criminal history that makes it more difficult to obtain
discretionary relief from removal.192 But it is also relevant that they are
routinely transferred thousands of miles from their communities,
sometimes multiple times, to public and private prisons.193 Sometimes
noncitizens are transferred to jurisdictions with less favorable case

186. According to data that I obtained from EOIR through a FOIA request, in FY2011
the BIA remanded (for reasons other than a background check) 2,763 noncitizen appeals of
immigration judges’ orders. That same year, the BIA terminated proceedings or granted
temporary protected status or voluntary departure (without first dismissing the noncitizen’s
appeal) in 181 cases. In FY2012, the BIA remanded (for reasons other than a background
check) 2,605 noncitizen appeals and terminated proceedings or granted temporary protected
status or voluntary departure in 192 cases. An additional 232 cases appealed by noncitizens
in FY2012 were administratively closed by DHS, while 54 more were administratively closed
by the BIA. See Letter from Cyrstal Souza, Supervisory Gov’t Info. Specialist, EOIR, to
Thomas Striepe, Faculty Servs. Librarian, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law (Aug. 26, 2013) (on file
with author). Of course, more often the BIA rules in favor of DHS. Id.
187. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Many crimes classified as misdemeanors, for example,
domestic offenses and petty shoplifting, have been determined to be “aggravated felonies” for
purposes of removal proceedings. See generally Cade, supra note 12.
188. See, e.g., Markowitz et al., supra note 169.
189. Id. at 19.
190. Id.
191. See ICE Seeks To Deport the Wrong People, supra note 182, fig.3 &
accompanying tbl. (reporting removal rejection rates for FY2010 in the Houston-Detained
court (only 6% rejected) versus the non-detained Houston Immigration Court (40% rejected),
although the data does not indicate how many of these persons were represented).
192. See Markowitz et al., supra note 169.
193. A Costly Move, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2011/06/14/costly-move; Markowitz et al., supra note 169.
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law.194 The conditions and duration of incarceration can make it
difficult to access counsel, evidence, or support networks, and thus
wear down resolve.195 Not surprisingly, noncitizens often give up their
right to fight removal or contest inaccurate charges that trigger harsher
penalties (like permanent banishment) in order to get out of
detention.196 Thus, ICE’s pursuit of inflated or inaccurate grounds of
removal may lead to outcome-determinative process costs. This
dynamic calls to mind Malcom Feeley’s classic study of Connecticut
misdemeanor courts, which led him to conclude that defendants were
motivated to plead guilty to escape the process of contesting minor
offenses—with its repeated delays, pretrial detention, and so on—
rather than to escape any possible penal sanction.197 Given the high
number of removal cases involving detained noncitizens—
194. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3, Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
1678 (2013) (No. 11-702) (collecting BIA cases involving immigrants convicted of the same
New York marijuana crime and demonstrating that those transferred to detention facilities
located in the Fifth Circuit were deemed to have committed an aggravated felony, while
noncitizens detained in the Second and Third Circuits, prevailed on that issue).
195. See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal
Immigration Appeals, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25-26 (2012); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers

to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention
Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 548 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN
THE UNITED STATES 41-57 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us1209webwcover.pdf; Jails and Jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention
System—A Two-Year Review, supra note 138; see also Markowitz et al., supra note 169, at 4,
9-11 (showing dramatic drops in representation rates for noncitizen residents of New York
City transferred to immigration court venues outside of New York City). In the New York
study, representation made a significant difference in the success rate, even for those detained
and transferred out of state. See id. at 21 & tbl.6. Further, access to counsel dramatically
improved the likelihood of detainee success across all classifications of relief applications, as
well as where no relief was requested at all. Id. at 20 & tbl.5. This suggests that some
nonnegligible portion of detained noncitizens have been erroneously charged—a problem not
easily overcome without the assistance of an attorney.
196. See, e.g., Cade, supra note 12, at 1801-02 (discussing the example of a detained
noncitizen who gave up fighting despite the likelihood of inaccurate removal charges);
Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration Litigation,
44 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author) (“[V]ery difficult detention
conditions create a strong incentive to agree to any option that will end the detention quickly,
and provides a strong disincentive to exercising rights of appeal, which can stretch a period of
detention out for months longer.” (footnote omitted)).
197. MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); see also Josh
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) (discussing the “innocence
problem” in plea bargaining). While in theory the process of fighting removal while subject
to lengthy detention in prison conditions might not outweigh the sanction of permanent
banishment on the aggravated felony removal ground, it is easy to see how many noncitizens
faced with such costs would throw in the towel, regardless of whether their removal charges
are warranted or accurate.
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approximately 36%—the impact of ICE’s charging decisions may be
widespread.198

C.

Exploitation of Discovery Asymmetries

There is little formal discovery in immigration court, and the
procedures that do exist are a patchwork of statutory provisions, court
rules, and regulations.199 Nevertheless, the INA does impose important
(if limited) disclosure obligations on the government.
First,
noncitizens must be provided with “a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against [them].”200 Second, a noncitizen seeking
to prove a right to stay in the United States should have access to all
“records and documents, not considered by the Attorney General to be
confidential, pertaining to the [noncitizen’s] admission or presence in
the United States.” 201 Additionally, the BIA has noted the trial
attorneys’ responsibility to help develop full records by sharing
relevant evidence in their possession, especially in asylum cases.202
Courts and commentators have noted similar disclosure obligations for
government attorneys enforcing civil law in other contexts.203
Despite these expectations and obligations, ICE prosecutors
regularly decline to provide noncitizens with relevant documents,
allowing them to exploit significant informational asymmetries. 204
Trial attorneys preparing to present evidence or cross-examine a
noncitizen in a removal proceeding have access to vast amounts of
information in the A-file, including all prior applications, entry and
exit data, interview notes, statements, medical examinations, tax
forms, and criminal records.205 By ignoring disclosure obligations,
they increase their opportunity to prevail through unfair surprise or
because of the noncitizen’s inability to obtain documents rebutting the

198. Office of Planning, Analysis, & Tech., FY2012 Statistical Year Book, DOJ O1
(Mar. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf.
199. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1581-1600.
200. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012).
201. Id. § 1229a(c)(2)(B).
202. See In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726-27, 738-39 (B.I.A. 1997); discussion
supra Part II.C.2.
203. See, e.g., Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980)); Berenson, supra note 100, at 19
(discussing and citing cases in support of the “civil obligation” to inform the court or the
opposing party about facts known to the government lawyer that might affect the outcome of
the litigation).
204. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-1600.
205. Id. at 1603-07.
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government’s charges or supporting claims for discretionary relief
from removal.206
As a practical matter, trial attorneys generally force noncitizens or
their attorneys to use the FOIA to obtain any part of the government’s
A-file. 207 Properly filing FOIA requests with the correct federal
agency or agencies is cumbersome and prone to both bureaucratic and
requester errors.208 Additionally, FOIA requests for immigration files
must slowly tread through significant backlogs.209 Even after responses
finally arrive, they are sometimes heavily redacted, and the
noncitizen’s only recourse for determining whether such redactions are
proper is litigation in federal court.210 Thus, the efficacy of this means
of discovery is haphazard at best.
Sometimes ICE prosecutors withhold documents in the
government’s possession that directly bear on whether a noncitizen
should be deported. A recent case concerned a pro se man named
Sazar Dent who claimed he was a U.S. citizen through adoption, which
would preclude the government from deporting him to Honduras on
criminal grounds. 211 With a substantial amount of difficulty, the
incarcerated Dent was able to obtain his twenty-year-old adoption
records, as well as his school records in the United States.212 But the
trial attorney in the case argued that Dent had not proven that his
adoptive mother was a citizen, and when Dent was unable to produce
her birth certificate, the immigration judge ordered him removed.213 In
a separate (later-aborted) criminal illegal-entry prosecution conducted
while his immigration appeals were pending, Dent’s federal defender
discovered that since the beginning of the deportation case the
government had been aware of documents in the A-file directly related
206. Id. at 1569-70.
207. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the government’s
position that noncitizens can only obtain records about themselves held by the government
through FOIA requests); Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-99; Assembly Line Injustice:
Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts, APPLESEED 25 (May 2009),
http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-Blueprintto-Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf.
208. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-96.
209. As of June 2013, ICE had a backlog of 6,699 unanswered requests for
immigration records, half of which had been pending for 116 days or longer. See Poor ICE
FOIA Management Hinders Public Access to Immigration Records, FOIA PROJECT (July 18,
2013), http://foiaproject.org/2013/07/18/poor-management-hinders-public-access-to-immigra
tion-records/.
210. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1597-99.
211. Dent, 627 F.3d 365.
212. Id. at 369.
213. Id. at 369-70.
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to his claims of citizenship, including the naturalization petition his
mother filed on his behalf when he was fourteen.214 The deportation
case eventually found its way to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, where the government acknowledged that ICE had
been aware of the relevant documents but argued that no law required
them to be disclosed.215 The Court disagreed,216 holding that the INA
establishes a “mandatory access” right to the A-file.217
Dent v. Holder is noteworthy for what it reveals about the way
some trial attorneys deal with evidence in the government’s possession
that might undermine the legitimacy of a particular deportation
proceeding. Even if the statutory disclosure obligation is ambiguous,
trial attorneys are trained that principles of fairness should guide their
duty to help respondents obtain procedural rights or statutory benefits.
Nevertheless, ICE attorneys have argued that Dent is applicable only in
the Ninth Circuit, and even there, many prosecutors reportedly
continue to ignore the A-file disclosure rule or apply it narrowly.218
Such actions are hard to square with the duty to seek justice, but from
the perspective of dogged enforcement it is easy to see why such
tactics are deployed. Declining to provide discovery gives trial
attorneys a significant informational advantage over noncitizens,
facilitating surprise cross-examinations and limiting the noncitizen’s
access to documents that might rebut the government’s charges or bear
on eligibility for relief.

D.

Other Hardball Tactics

Withholding relevant documents in the noncitizen’s A-file is not
the only prosecutorial tactic that some trial attorneys use to prioritize
winning over the development of a full and fair record. For many
years, court observation studies, anecdotal reports, and judicial
decisions have suggested that ICE prosecutors often litigate in ways

214. Id. at 372.
215. Id. at 370-73.
216. Id. at 373-75 (finding a violation of due process and transferring the matter to
district court to adjudicate whether Dent had become a naturalized citizen).
217. Id. at 374-75 (“We construe the ‘shall have access’ statute to provide a rule for
removal proceedings . . . . We are unable to imagine a good reason for not producing the Afile routinely without a request, but another case may address that issue when facts call for
it.”).
218. See Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-72; Am. Immigration Council, Practice
Advisory, LEGAL ACTION CENTER 4 (June 12, 2012), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/
default/files/dent_practice_advisory_6-8-12.pdf.
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that capitalize on surprise, mistakes, and the vulnerability of
noncitizens. This Subpart briefly surveys some of those accounts.
In the late 1980s, Professor Deborah Anker and other researchers
studied the adjudication of 193 hearings involving 149 asylum seekers
in one jurisdiction.219 In all 149 cases, the INS prosecutors “took an
oppositional stance.”220 While a few trial attorneys were observed to
conduct professional and respectful cross-examinations, most were
“hostile, sarcastic, or disbelieving.”221 In hearing after hearing, the
prosecutors’ cross-examinations attacked the applicants’ moral
character, rather than addressing eligibility for asylum, and were
“lengthy and aggressive.”222 Trial attorneys employed tactics “to block
the applicant from elaborating or explaining her answer and seemed to
have as their purpose portraying the applicant as evasive.”223
Prosecutorial tactics that focused on obtaining removal orders
through any means necessary, rather than developing and testing the
merits of the asylum claim, were commonly observed.224 In one case,
for example, the trial attorney disclosed to a court observer that he was
aware the immigration judge had made a substantial error of law that
would have otherwise allowed the noncitizen to avoid a deportation
order, but felt it was not his responsibility to inform the court or the
noncitizen.225 In another, the judge ordered a noncitizen removed in
absentia when his counsel arrived late for the hearing, but stated he
would reopen the proceedings if the government consented. The trial
attorney refused to consent, and when interviewed by the researchers
after the hearing he was frank: “[INS] wants a deport[ation] order. We
couldn’t have done better.”226
More recent interview- and observation-based reports suggest
that little constrains ICE prosecutors from employing the same sort of
sharp tactics that Professor Anker observed, if they wish to. One set of
219. Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment,
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 443-45 (1992) (observing asylum adjudication
proceedings and interviewing hearing participants and other government officials between
February 1987 and November 1988). To protect the anonymity of participants in the study,
Professor Anker revealed only that the immigration court studied was in a major urban center.
Id. at 443 n.31.
220. Id. at 492. This included a case where the United States Department of State had
issued a visa to allow the noncitizen to flee persecution in Colombia. Id. at 492 n.259.
221. Id. at 493.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 490-96.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 491 & n.256.
226. Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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findings came from a study conducted in 2009 by the Chicago
Appleseed Fund for Justice, in partnership with several major law
firms.227 According to the report, over 100 lawyers and 22 professional
staff members from Latham & Watkins LLP, and Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld LLP observed more than 100 hours of immigration
court hearings and conducted in excess of 100 interviews of
practitioners, government players, nonprofit officials, professional
organization leaders, and academics, covering a range of jurisdictions
throughout the country.228
Many of those interviewed expressed the belief that some ICE
prosecutors “invariably seek the worst outcome possible for the
immigrant and unnecessarily drag out cases by litigating every
issue.”229 Advocates encountered trial attorneys who rarely return
phone calls or other communications, refuse to negotiate in order to
narrow issues, fail to drop weak cases, and take extreme positions on
removability.230 In one proceeding cited by the report, ICE contended
that a noncitizen provided “material support” to terrorists based solely
on the fact that Burundi rebels robbed him of four dollars and his
lunch.231 The report concluded that many ICE prosecutors operate with
a “deport-in-all-cases” mindset.232
After conducting a follow-up national study in 2011 and 2012,233
Chicago Appleseed reported other examples of ICE prosecutors
indiscriminately seeking deportation, rarely agreeing to discuss issues
in advance of hearings, and declining to stipulate to obvious issues.234
One New York area immigration practitioner stated that “in twelve
years of practice in this area, I have one time had a call returned from a
[DHS trial attorney] before the hearing. One time.”235 Notably, even
the information gathered from government stakeholders themselves
generally supported these observations.236
227. See Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration
Courts, supra note 207.
228. Id. at 1-2.
229. Id. at 16.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 39-48. The 2012 report appears to have
been based on more extensive participation from government stakeholders than the 2009
report. Id. at 12 (describing the report’s methodology).
234. Id. at 42-43, 47.
235. Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. See id. at 46-47 (discussing the prevalence of chief counsel offices not having any
policy or practice on prehearing conferences or other communications with defense counsel).
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A 2010 report for the American Bar Association (ABA) reached
similar conclusions about the immigration system.237 It found, “Many
believe that . . . DHS attorneys do not exercise prosecutorial discretion
to promote efficiency or fairness in removal proceedings.”238 In one
example cited by the report, an ICE attorney privately acknowledged
the strength of a noncitizen’s asylum case but contested it anyway and
refused to stipulate to any facts.239 Various federal judges240 and law
professors with extensive experience in immigration courts241 have also
observed the aggressively hard-nosed approach often taken by
government attorneys in deportation proceedings. A recent federal
lawsuit concerning an immigration case in which the BIA found
evidence of “document tampering” by a Seattle ICE prosecutor

237. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 57. The report was generated after a year of
study by fifty Arnold & Porter LLP lawyers and legal assistants, who participated in the pro
bono project “without preconceived notions or conclusions.” Id. at v-vi. According to the
ABA, the study consisted of interviews with participants from all perspectives in the removal
adjudication system, as well as an extensive review of reports, articles, legislative materials,
and other documents. Id. at vi.
238. Id. at 1-28.
239. Id. at 1-29.
240. See, e.g., Flores v. USCIS, 718 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We are disturbed
by the Government’s incessant and injudicious opposition in [immigration] cases like this,
where the only purpose seems to be a general policy of opposition for the sake of
opposition.”); Diric v. INS, 400 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1968) (Ely, J. concurring) (“It
distresses me that an alien must depart our country with the justified impression that the
Government of the United States, through an over-zealous advocate, has been unnecessarily
unkind, if not abusive.”).
241. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 105, at 97-98; Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of Oscar Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L.
REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 437, 530 (2013) (“I continue to learn after years of handling
cases, observing the agency, and talking with other practitioners, that relying on
administrative good faith is a mistake . . . .”); Kidane, supra note 15, at 655 (“[I]n deportation
proceedings . . . the combatants are the government’s ‘gladiator-attorneys’ who are not
primarily crusading after the truth, but seeking to win on the one hand, and the unrepresented
noncitizen on the other hand.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the
Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 536 (2013) (“DHS attorneys also
operate within a courtroom culture marked by a severe absence of stipulations and
discussions with respondents, even those with counsel, to settle on an outcome that reflects an
arms’ length negotiation between both parties.”); Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees:
Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 651, 661 n.24 (2010) (“[I]n the vast majority of cases, DHS attorneys challenge
applicants’ corroborating evidence, cross-examine applicants to elicit contradictions, argue
that applicants do not meet the statutory standards for asylum, and in other ways vigorously
oppose a grant of asylum, treating asylum applications in immigration court like other forms
of contested civil or criminal litigation, even when applicants are unable to afford or obtain
representation.”).
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suggests some trial attorneys may be willing to go to even greater
lengths to remove noncitizens.242
As should be clear, the anecdotal nature of these observations
suggests they should be evaluated with caution. We simply do not
have competent data from which to form generalizations about ICE’s
culture. Indeed, my own encounters with the chief counsel’s office in
New York City over a period of four years were mixed.243 But these
positive accounts do permit a critical observation: ICE attorneys can
take a no-holds-barred approach if they so choose. No serious
structural constraints impede large numbers of government lawyers
from going full throttle in seeking deportations, even when doing so
raises serious questions of procedural fairness and substantive justice.
While winning at all costs may be par for the course in much civil
litigation brought by private parties, government attorneys with a role
as ministers of justice must temper hardball tactics, especially in
settings where the targets of their efforts are often poor and
unrepresented.244 Advancing justice requires government attorneys to
facilitate the development of full and fair records and to refrain from
exploiting power asymmetries that favor the government.245 And, as we
have seen, a variety of legal sources make such obligations concrete
242. See Complaint for Damages, Lanuza v. Love, No. 2:14-cv-01641-MJP (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 23, 2014); Liz Jones, Lawsuit Claims ICE Attorney Manufactured Evidence in
Seattle Deportation Case, KUOW.ORG (Oct. 23, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://kuow.org/post/lawsuitclaims-ice-attorney-manufactured-evidence-seattle-deportation-case.
243. While a few assistant chief counsels in New York City’s immigration court
returned phone calls or e-mails, stipulated to issues, and joined motions in compelling cases,
others took a zero-tolerance approach to seemingly every case. In one example of the latter, I
represented a sixteen-year-old Haitian girl with a slight developmental disability who was
adjusting her status to that of a lawful permanent resident based on adoption by American
parents. Although her only negative history was a trespass violation (incurred while changing
into clothes forbidden by her adoptive parents behind a neighbor’s house on the way to
school), the trial attorney conducted an aggressive and lengthy cross-examination, apparently
fishing for evidence of my client’s involvement with guns, gangs, or drugs. Eventually the
interrogation concluded, and the immigration judge granted my client lawful permanent
resident status. In another case involving this same attorney, the immigration judge
terminated the proceedings due to CBP’s violation of my client’s due process rights.
Although she was a minor child living with lawfully present relatives and had no criminal
history, the attorney had arranged for CBP officers to be present outside the hearing to
rearrest her should she prevail in the termination hearing.
244. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., 74
F.R.D. 628, 632-35 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (noting the government’s obligation to seek justice
applies in civil enforcement actions, likening the government attorney’s overzealous and
“vexatious” tactics to “hunting mice with an elephant gun,” and awarding attorney’s fees to
the defending party).
245. See, e.g., In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997); MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980); Berenson, supra note 100, at 29-30 (citing City of
Los Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1977)); Green, supra note 101, at 265-67.
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for ICE prosecutors.246 As we have also seen, however, trial attorneys
can, and sometimes do, proceed with cases that have been
inadequately screened for merit, accuracy, or the exercise of equitable
discretion.
IV. PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
Having explored many of the potential ways that trial attorneys
can depart from their duty to pursue justice, we can now consider
possible sources of the problem. Since Max Weber’s pioneering work
on bureaucracies in the 1920s,247 many political scientists and legal
scholars have expanded upon his insight that an organization’s design
impacts the behavior of its members.248 The institutional, financial, and
political factors that influence how bureaucracies operate are often
variable and difficult to measure.249 In most settings, however, certain
organizational features tend to be particularly salient. These include:
(1) the agency’s mission, (2) the resources available to the agency’s
frontline workers, (3) patterns of practice within the agency, and
(4) accountability and performance measures.250 Although it is beyond
the scope of this Article to examine comprehensively the extent to
which these features shape the behavior of ICE trial attorneys, their
connection with the problems discussed in Part III is readily
apparent.251
In particular, ICE prosecutors’ enforcement bias and excessive
workloads go a long way toward explaining the inconsistent
fulfillment of justice obligations. I consider the role of enforcement
bias in Part IV.A and the role of excessive workloads in Part IV.B. The
246. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
247. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978).
248. See, e.g., LIPSKY, supra note 81; JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE
(1983) [hereinafter MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE]; JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) [hereinafter MASHAW, DUE PROCESS]; PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006);
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT
(1989); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
249. See, e.g., MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 248, at 13 (summarizing
James Q. Wilson’s argument that “regulatory activities and the politics that produce
regulatory legislation are too varied to be explained satisfactorily by a parsimonious set of
hypotheses”).
250. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 27-28; see WILSON, supra note 248, at 23-28.
251. For an analysis of how James Q. Wilson’s theory of bureaucracy maps onto ICE’s
broader culture, see Rabin, supra note 13.
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centrality of these forces in immigration enforcement points to an
important parallel with the operation of government agencies engaged
in criminal prosecution, to which I turn in Part IV.C.

A. Enforcement Bias
Prosecutors prosecute. Their core mission, shared by others with
whom they work, focuses on law enforcement. Consequently, as many
experts have noted, a “prosecutor bias” can take hold at the expense of
other values and objectives.252 Thus, it is not surprising that prosecutor
bias plays a role in shaping the mindset of ICE attorneys. As described
in Part II, law enforcement objectives have long been central to the
immigration agency’s mission, and only intensified in the bureaucratic
restructuring following 9/11. Even before the creation of ICE,
commentators within and outside the INS noted the agency’s tendency
to focus on enforcement objectives.253 For example, Grover Rees, the
former general counsel of INS, once acknowledged, “For too many
INS officials, the answer is easy: we are the Anti-Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and we are about keeping people out.”254
By defining and continually affirming ICE’s role as centering on
the prevention of terrorism or other threats to national security,
government leaders promote prosecutor bias and enforcement
stringency.255 Forging a conceptual connection between immigration
252. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 2225 (2012); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the
Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 306-19 (2013); Bruce A. Green & Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 488 (2009); see, e.g., Charles Perrow, The Disaster after 9/11: The
Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Reorganization, 2 HOMELAND
SECURITY AFF. 1 (2006) (“It seems plausible that FEMA’s absorption by the Department of
Homeland Security, the resulting emphasis on terrorism rather than natural disasters, and the
inattention to natural disasters by the Bush Administration, account for much of the
[Hurricane] Katrina and Rita failures.”).
253. See, e.g., Scully, supra note 86, at 941 (“[T]he Service’s enforcement function has
generally overshadowed its adjudications function. . . . [E]very applicant must be seen as
suspect.”); Daniel W. Sutherland, The Federal Immigration Bureaucracy: The Achilles Heel
of Immigration Reform, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 109, 119 (1996) (describing the “law
enforcement mentality adopted throughout the agency”); see also Rabin, supra note 13, at
213 (discussing the agency’s focus on law enforcement).
254. Grover Joseph Rees, III, Advice for the New INS Commissioner, 70
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533, 1534 (1993).
255. See JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY 6, 1417 (2011); Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra
note 22, at 1656; see also Perrow, supra note 252, at 15-17 (explaining how bringing disparate
agencies under DHS’s umbrella led to the displacement of their prior non-security missions);
David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act Reorganization: An
Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 2003), http://www.
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enforcement and national security, whether justified or not, also serves
to entrench public expectations about the agency’s mission.256 This can
create a “policy feedback” loop as the government’s initial statements
and actions create a narrative about what a policy is intended to
achieve, which in turn generates expectations that the agency will
fulfill that narrative.257 Indeed, given the pervasive conceptual links
between immigration law, crime, and terrorism, the development of
“tunnel vision” among ICE attorneys may be even more pronounced
than it is among criminal prosecutors,258 especially those prosecutors
who regularly appear in diversion or problem-solving courts.
There is also another force that cultivates prosecutorial bias. To
the extent that quantifiable metrics for measuring the achievement of
agency objectives are available, both managers and ground-level
officials will tend to orient their work towards fulfillment of those
measurable goals.259 Removal numbers—especially with respect to
noncitizens with any criminal history—have proven to be critical
tokens in the immigration debate as the Obama Administration, like
administrations before it, strives to promote its image of effectiveness
with lawmakers and the public. 260 Indeed, ICE under President
Obama’s leadership has removed more noncitizens than any other
administration in history.261
migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-policy-and-homeland-security-act-reorganizationearly-agenda-practical (discussing the duties of INS being transferred to DHS under the
Homeland Security Act).
256. See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Immigrants and the Government’s War on Terrorism,
6 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 225, 230 (2006) (“[T]he reorganization’s symbolic message to
American society and the world at large was that immigration was inextricably intertwined
with terrorism.”).
257. Cuéllar, supra note 82, at 57-58.
258. See SIMON, supra note 252, at 22-25 (explaining the prevalence of tunnel vision
among prosecutors and other law enforcement officers); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note
252, at 488 (explaining that prosecutors may be prone to view evidence “through the lens of
. . . preexisting expectations and conclusions”); see also Developments in the Law—
Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 22, at 1655 (suggesting that the
segregation of immigration benefits and removal operations in 2003 may have aggravated
“the enforcement regime’s propensity for overreach by limiting enforcement officers’
interaction with professionals whose duties would have led them to understand and learn
about immigration enforcement through a humanitarian lens” (footnotes omitted) (citing Jody
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1131, 1184 (2012)).
259. WILSON, supra note 248, at 159-71.
260. Rabin, supra note 13.
261. See Barack Obama, Deporter-in-Chief, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.
economist.com/node/21595902/ (“America is expelling illegal immigrants at nine times the
rate of 20 years ago; nearly [two million] so far under Barack Obama, easily outpacing any
previous president.” (citations omitted)). The magnitude of the current rate of deportations is
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Further, the composition of an organization’s leadership and
employees significantly shapes its culture and its approach to
balancing competing interests. As Rachel Barkow has observed,
“leadership and personnel decisions can . . . help to foster a selfperpetuating culture that will be particularly powerful if it feeds into
the political dynamics that support the agency’s dominant mission.”262
It is telling, in this regard, that persons with significant law
enforcement or military experience hold nearly every top- and midlevel leadership position in ICE.263 The law enforcement perspective of
the agency’s leaders thus aligns powerfully with the political
economies that initially led Congress to displace the INS in order to
create an agency better equipped to protect the country.264 In such an
environment, it may fairly be expected that many rank-and-file ICE
prosecutors will view every immigration case they handle through the
lens of national security.
If the agency’s hawkish culture contributes to ICE attorneys’
failure to seek justice in individual cases, should the culture be altered?
Perhaps DHS could systematically emphasize ICE’s concurrent
commitment to the humanitarian and benefits functions of the
immigration system through leadership changes, focused training
sessions, public statements, and so forth. But this approach is unlikely
to gain traction. Rolling back law enforcement rhetoric offers little
political gain, while exposing agency leaders to critiques and reprisals.
Moreover, effectuating systemic and lasting change in an agency’s

best appreciated by observing that from 1892 to 2007, the U.S. government deported about
two million individuals in total—a figure that has been doubled in the past seven years. Elise
Foley, Obama Deportation Toll Could Pass 2 Million at Current Rates, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 31, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/31/obama-deportation_n_
2594012.html. Although the Obama Administration touts increased removals of “criminal
aliens,” that classification is contestable. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://nytimes.
com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html.
262. Barkow, supra note 252, at 312.
263. According to the biographies posted on ICE’s public website, the vast majority of
the top- and mid-level leadership positions in recent years have been occupied by persons
with significant law enforcement backgrounds. See ICE Leadership, ICE, http://www.ice.
gov/leadership (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); National Security Investigations Division, ICE,
http://www.ice.gov/national-security-investigations-division (last visited Oct. 24, 2014);
Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
264. A former trial attorney confided to researchers conducting the first Chicago
Appleseed study of immigration courts his view that after 9/11, the agency’s objective that its
prosecutors “see that justice is served” was replaced by a “zero-tolerance” mindset.
Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts, supra note
207, at 17.
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culture is exceedingly difficult.265 Finally, as the next Subpart suggests,
prosecutor bias is likely not the only relevant factor here. The
tendency toward an across-the-board mindset for the handling of cases
is reinforced by the work burdens that ICE lawyers carry.

B.

Workload

There is no doubt that ICE prosecutors face daunting workloads.
In 2005, around 579 ICE attorneys were responsible for over 184,000
pending cases.266 By ICE’s own calculations, this caseload left trial
attorneys only about twenty minutes to prepare each case.267 Today, the
ratio of prosecutors to workload is even worse, with just 505 onboard
trial attorneys handling an average of more than 350 cases each year.268
The current backlog stands at 396,552 pending removal cases—more
than double what it was in 2005.269 As ICE’s Principal Legal Advisor
reported in 2009, “the universal feeling” among assistant chief
counsels nationwide is that “they are woefully unprepared for
immigration hearings due to the extremely large amount of individual
cases they are required to cover.”270
Limited time to review and prepare cases has predictable
consequences. Prosecutors decline to assess carefully whether
favorable discretion is warranted in individual cases because they
come to handle cases in an assembly-line, if not triage, mode. This
same problem has received substantial scrutiny in criminal law
scholarship, especially with respect to our nation’s swollen
265. See Barkow, supra note 252; Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS,
DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 52, 61 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (“[N]either individual
nor institutional behavior can be readily altered by simple government ukase.”).
266. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-206, DHS IMMIGRATION
ATTORNEYS: WORKLOAD ANALYSIS AND WORKFORCE PLANNING EFFORTS LACK DATA AND
DOCUMENTATION 10 (2007) (indicating that as of September 30, 2006, DHS employed 579
ICE attorneys in 51 field offices throughout the United States, headed by a Director with
assistance from 26 Chief Counsels); Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 153 (noting
that there were 184,211 cases pending in 2006).
267. Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts,
supra note 207, at 16 (“According to the ICE Principal Legal Advisor, in 2005 Trial Attorneys
had only about 20 minutes to prepare each case . . . .” (citing Memorandum from William J.
Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27)).
268. Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA Officer, ICE, to Thomas Striepe,
Faculty Servs. Librarian, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law (July 11, 2014) (on file with author);
Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 39-40.
269. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 153.
270. Legomsky, supra note 71, at 1654 (quoting E-mail from Peter Vincent, Principal
Legal Advisor, ICE, to author (Aug. 19, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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misdemeanor system.271 When prosecutors have insufficient time to
carry out what they view as their primary responsibilities, they are less
likely to find time to complete tasks they deem secondary.272 Sorting
meritorious cases quickly can be challenging, as the charging
documents in immigration court often consist primarily of a series of
conclusory allegations of immigration violations and obtaining reliable
additional information is costly. 273 One regional ICE supervisor
reflected on the fact that in the face of an exploding immigration
docket, he often “feels like we are dodging bullets.”274 In light of ICE’s
heavy caseloads, it is easy to see why trial attorneys might not have
time to look closely enough at any particular case to feel confident that
backing away from all-out prosecution is warranted, except in the
small percentage of cases where competent counsel or immigration
judges push hard enough on ICE to gain exceptional treatment.275
The problem is highlighted by the work of Michael Lipsky on
street-level bureaucracies. As he explained, resource constraints pose
special difficulties when either of two conditions is present: (1) the
number of people processed is only a fraction of the number that could
be processed or (2) the agency’s obligations call for a higher quality of
work than it is possible to provide in individual cases.276 The essential
problem when one of these conditions exists is straightforward:
demand will rise to devour any increase in the agency’s supply of
services, whether quantitative or qualitative. Additional expressway
lanes bring more drivers to the road. Teachers whose class size is
reduced from thirty to twenty-five still must manage disciplinary
problems and learning experiences in substantially the same way. Both
271. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not To Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); Cade, supra note 12, at 1781-85;
Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 26; King, supra note 47, at 20; Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor
System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013); see also LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 5, 27
(explaining that the work of “street-level bureaucrats” is extremely labor-intensive because
they determine eligibility for benefits and sanctions through direct, individual interactions
with large numbers of people).
272. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2471 (2004) (“Prosecutors have personal incentives to reduce their workloads so that
they can leave work early enough to dine with their families.”); Bowers, supra note 197, at
1140-41.
273. Cf. Bowers, supra note 271, at 1702 (“Prosecutors can proceed with almost
everything, because all cases look good enough; and they cannot determine what to cast
aside, because no case looks all that bad.”).
274. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 40-42 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
275. Id.
276. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 33, 37-38.
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of these resource complications are present for trial attorneys handling
immigration cases.
Today it is estimated that around eleven million unauthorized
noncitizens reside in the United States.277 Millions more are lawfully
present but potentially deportable on the basis of criminal history or
immigration infractions. 278 So while massive funding increases
enabled the Obama Administration to remove a record 400,000
persons in the past year, that is but a tiny fraction of the number that
could be processed. While a historical challenge in immigration
enforcement was identifying and apprehending undocumented
immigrants, as well as noncitizens lawfully present but potentially
deportable on the basis of criminal convictions,279 this obstacle is now
much diminished. Through a combination of cooperative relationships
with local and state law enforcement agencies, data-sharing
technology, and well-resourced programs that enable immigration
agents to access detention facilities in every jurisdiction, the
government now has the ability to screen nearly every noncitizen who
comes into contact with the criminal justice system.280 Additionally, in
recent years a number of states have passed legislation authorizing or
requiring local authorities to enforce federal immigration law281—for
example, by verifying the immigration status of every person who is
stopped, detained, or arrested.282 These activities of state and local
authorities, in combination with the significant efforts of what is now
the federal government’s second largest law enforcement agency, pipe
277. See Passel & Cohn, supra note 3.
278. Id. at 9; see Morawetz, supra note 29.
279. Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 613, 615 (2012) (citing numerous authorities); Peter H. Schuck & John
Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 367 (1999) (describing the historical “failures” of the immigration system at
identifying and removing noncitizens convicted of crimes in state and local courts).
280. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42057, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS
13-17 (2012) (describing ICE programs targeting noncitizens who encounter law
enforcement); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87,
91-96 (2013).
281. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-6 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051 (2014); GA.
CODE § 17-5-100(b) (2014); UTAH CODE § 76-9-1001 to -1009 (2014).
282. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051(B); GA. CODE § 17-5-100; IND. CODE § 5-218.2-4 (2014); S.C. CODE § 17-13-170 (2013); UTAH CODE § 76-9-1003. Potentially
deportable arrestees are marked with an immigration detainer, which generally functions to
ensure that such noncitizens are transferred to immigration custody at the point that they
otherwise would have been released by law enforcement. See also Cade, supra note 12, at
1763-65 (discussing ICE programs to identify noncitizens who have criminal records, making
them potentially deportable).
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ever growing numbers of potentially deportable noncitizens into
immigration court.283
From the trial attorney’s point of view, the ready supply line of
cases from the vast pool of potentially deportable noncitizens means
that when one case is dismissed, another will always be there to take its
place.284 Thus, even adding a large number of agency attorneys may
not go far in changing ICE’s prosecutorial culture. In practical effect,
the current supply of potentially deportable noncitizens is
inexhaustible; thus an increased capacity would simply result in
“reproducing the level of service quality at a higher volume.”285 At
best, the active caseload managed by each attorney would remain the
same, while the inactive load would decrease slightly.286
Heavy, intractable caseloads help to explain why some ICE
prosecutors bring aggressive or uncooperative behavior into the
handling of cases that go forward. First, until the hearing is underway,
the trial attorney may have little idea whether the government’s
grounds for deportation (or the noncitizen’s grounds for relief) are
meritorious.287 Trial attorneys thus may seek to compensate for a lack
of knowledge by maintaining resolve and preserving leverage until an
approaching hearing date gets the case off the backburner. Further,
with insufficient time to prepare for addressing the merits of any
particular noncitizen’s claim to asylum or other relief, the ICE attorney
may instead rely on wide-ranging cross-examinations that often come
to center on the magnification of perceived weaknesses in the
noncitizen’s testimony or challenges to the noncitizen’s moral
character.288 Moreover, once courtroom proceedings have begun, the
instinct to win may take over—no matter how strong the noncitizen’s
right to remain may appear.289
283. Cade, supra note 12, at 1765; Brian A. Reaves, Federal Law Enforcement
Officers, 2008, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (June 2012), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleO08.
pdf.
284. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 27, 29, 33 (explaining that street-level bureaucracies are
chronically under-resourced, as demand for services typically rises with any increases in
supply).
285. Id. at 38.
286. Id. at 36; see also Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office,
supra note 76 (explaining that her regional office of fewer than ten attorneys is responsible for
somewhere on the order of 4,500 pending cases, though many are not currently active).
287. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1309 (1990).
288. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1626; Martin, supra note 287, at 1308.
289. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 287, at 1309 (“Moreover, as one attorney told me,
even when it appears to be a strong case, his instincts (and perhaps his inevitable role under
this structure) lead him to react in a particular way: ‘When it’s there in the courtroom, I’m
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Finally, the unceasing flow of repetitive cases—especially in
jurisdictions where immigration fraud is, or is perceived to be,
common—may desensitize some ICE prosecutors to “the human
dimensions of the job.”290 One trial attorney with whom I spoke
relayed that recurrent work on matters involving claims that “everyone
knows [are] a farce” becomes “soul-sucking.”291 Such experiences
inevitably dampen any potential desire to sort out appropriate cases for
the exercise of favorable discretion.

C.

Lessons from Criminal Law

It bears repeating that the justice-seeking responsibilities of ICE’s
prosecutors are embedded in statutes, case law, training materials, and
policy memoranda. The pronouncements bespeak a commitment to
fairness values that the agency’s actions thus far have failed to make a
reality. What is more, enforcement bias and heavy workloads are
features of ICE’s culture that are not easily susceptible to change. How
then, can the agency improve the quality of its efforts to foster the
pursuit of justice by its frontline attorneys?
A potentially fruitful point of comparison may be found in the
administration of criminal law. Although criminal systems vary
widely, even within states, all employ a number of procedural
mechanisms and design features that encourage their prosecutors to
seek justice, and not just convictions, despite the fact that they too
must contend with tunnel-vision tendencies and sometimes
overwhelming caseloads. If the analogy between immigration removal
adjudication and the criminal system is apt, some of these features
might be implemented within ICE to heighten the trial attorneys’
accountability and incentives to seek justice.
In important respects, the criminal and administrative removal
systems, and the function of government prosecutors in each, are
similar—and increasingly so. The ostensible mission of each is to
determine, through adversarial proceedings, whether significant
statutory penalties should be imposed on the basis of past conduct. In
both systems, the contest is frequently lopsided, pitting trained govern‘agin’ it.’”); see also Barkow, supra note 252, at 313 (explaining that the “will-to-win can
create cognitive biases in even the most well-intentioned prosecutors”); Bibas, supra note
272, at 2471-72 (discussing the importance of high conviction rates to prosecutors); Bowers,
supra note 271, at 1703 & n.224 (discussing the incentives for prosecutors to pursue
convictions).
290. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 37.
291. Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office, supra note 76.
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ment attorneys wielding the vast power of the state against persons
who most of the time cannot afford to hire their own lawyers. And the
government’s initial charging decisions in both immigration and
criminal proceedings frequently produce both immediate detention and
a frame of possible outcomes that shape the adjudicative process in
fundamental ways.292
Immigration and criminal law have also increasingly converged,
especially since legislation in the 1990s dramatically expanded the
grounds of detention and removal on the basis of criminal history.293
Today, the path to a removal hearing frequently begins with some kind
of contact with law enforcement officials, often at the state or local
level.294 The administrative removal system is then employed as an
add-on, or even an alternative, to the criminal prosecution, especially
for noncitizens arrested for misdemeanors and immigration
violations.295 Moreover, because so many of these matters are handed
off to ICE attorneys, they are often the first (and last) government
lawyers in a position to evaluate the propriety of the noncitizen’s arrest,
just like criminal prosecutors who handle criminal prosecutions.296
Perhaps most saliently, because each system is built around an
elaborate code that puts many more people in violation of the law than
either regime can possibly subject to enforcement, both criminal
prosecutors and immigration trial attorneys inevitably must make
choices about how, and against whom, the law is applied. This
prosecutorial discretion goes largely unchecked by courts—though for
somewhat different reasons—in each system. Because only about 5%
of criminal cases proceed to trial, much of what criminal prosecutors
do—investigation, charging, and plea negotiating—is subject to little
review by a judge.297 While criminal judges ultimately must approve
plea bargains before ordering a judgment of conviction, they have little
292. See discussion supra Part III.B.
293. See discussion supra Parts II.A and IV.A.
294. Cade, supra note 11, at 182-83.
295. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1337-59
(2010).
296. Cade, supra note 11, at 186-200 (considering ICE prosecutors’ responsibilities
following unchecked violations of noncitizens’ constitutional rights by arresting officers).
297. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND
EXERCISES 831-60 (5th ed. 2013); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1987) (“Few officials can so affect the
lives of others as can prosecutors. Yet few operate in a vacuum so devoid of externally
enforceable constraints.”). To be sure, criminal judges presiding over preliminary hearings
and motions do have a hand in whether cases go forward, so charging decisions are not
entirely insulated from review.
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incentive not to accept the agreement as long as the plea is knowingly
and voluntarily made.298 Similarly, statutory limitations on judicial
review of immigration proceedings, as well as institutionally driven
policies of deference to the Executive Branch in this area, all but
foreclose judicial checking of discretionary decisions made by ICE
and its trial attorneys.299
Criminal prosecutors are expected to exercise discretion to avoid
subjecting defendants to unwarranted loss of liberty, harassment,
anxiety, or stigma. Their use of discretion is seen as integral to
achieving justice in the criminal system, and the decision whether to
prosecute requires “consideration of the individual facts and
circumstances of each case.”300 Because criminal prosecutors act on
behalf of a “sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all,” they have a responsibility
not to simply obtain convictions, but also to do what is right.301
Despite the esteem in which criminal prosecutors are held and the
largely unreviewable freedom they are given, they are not left
completely to their own devices with respect to the “justice” part of the
job. Rather, numerous mechanisms are employed to check prosecutorial abuse and error and to reduce power asymmetries between the
government and the defendants. Constitutionally driven procedural
measures include the rights to (1) counsel at the government’s expense
for indigents, (2) effective assistance of counsel, (3) review of probable
cause determinations, (4) a public trial, (5) a trial by a jury of peers or
an impartial judge, (6) the prohibition of double jeopardy, and

298. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 111-36 (2003) (discussing judicial incentives to prefer plea
bargains). Although a trio of recent Supreme Court cases may spur judges to investigate the
content of plea negotiations, these concern the effective assistance of defense counsel and
therefore offer little in the way of checks on prosecutorial discretion. See Lafler v. Cooper,
132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390-91 (2012) (holding that a defense counsel’s incompetent advice about
the merits of taking a particular plea offer establishes prejudice); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1408 (2012) (requiring that defendants be informed about any potentially beneficial
plea offers from the prosecution); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486-87 (2010)
(holding that defendants have a constitutional right to advice about the deportation
consequences of convictions).
299. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 30, at 1270-80; Hiroshi Motomura,

Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
300. DAVIS, supra note 28, at 14; see also Bowers, supra note 271, at 1663-78.
Criminal prosecutors, wielding the immense power of the government, are also expected to
seek just outcomes and ensure fair process. See Green, supra note 99, at 612-18.
301. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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(7) exoneration if the government does not meet its burden of proof.302
Other mechanisms have constitutional origins but have also been
developed and expanded through legislation and administrative policy,
including the availability of pretrial motions and hearings, speedy trial
rules, and discovery obligations.303 Still other organizational design
features, like vertical prosecution arrangements, have been widely
implemented in prosecutors’ offices as a related policy choice to
increase accountability and efficiency.304 All of these protections may
not attach to every kind of prosecution, and there are variations in the
form of each rule across jurisdictions and types of criminal
proceedings. Nor are the features fail-safe: prosecutorial errors and
overreaches persist.305 Nevertheless, the administrative mechanisms
considered here can be usefully generalized and are more or less a part
of all criminal systems. Our history is replete with reminders of how
much more tenuous the criminal system’s hold on justice would be if
these protective procedures did not check prosecutorial authority.306
To be sure, there are significant differences between criminal
tribunals and immigration courts. The presumption of a defendant’s
innocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt helps justify
heightened procedural safeguards in criminal systems. In addition,
criminal sanctions can include lengthy prison sentences (including life
without parole) and capital punishment. They also can trigger a host
of collateral consequences that follow the convicted individual for an
entire lifetime.307
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
an order of deportation is often more onerous than many penal
sanctions.308 This is increasingly the case, as tougher immigration laws
retroactively make lawfully present noncitizens with deep roots in their
302. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POSTINVESTIGATION (2d ed. 2009); Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267 (1975) (summarizing the universe of procedural rights potentially available in any
proceeding).
303. Friendly, supra note 302.
304. See, e.g., Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125
(2005).
305. Id.
306. See DAVIS, supra note 28, at 9-12 (relating the history of the American
prosecutor); see also Cade, supra note 46, at 391-98, 402-04 (surveying historical uses of the
pardon power that stimulated reforms to criminal defendants’ procedural protections).
307. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 35-179 (2013).
308. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
322-23 (2001); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947); Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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communities subject to deportation, even on the basis of minor
convictions that occurred many decades ago.309 And despite the higher
burden of proof in criminal cases, the real-world operation of the
criminal justice system often makes it easy for prosecutors to obtain
guilty pleas simply by piling up charges that the accused must defend
against.310 It is at trial where most due process criminal procedure
rights come into play. Yet most criminal prosecutions do not go to
trial, 311 so that in practice, the criminal system bears a closer
resemblance to removal proceedings than might first meet the eye. In
short, while there are natural differences between administrative
removal hearings and criminal prosecutions, they are a great deal alike
in important respects.312
It follows that DHS would do well to consider borrowing certain
pretrial mechanisms that criminal systems typically use to encourage
prosecutors to facilitate justice and, more particularly, to counter the
pressures that prosecutor bias and case overload bring to bear in the
criminal justice system. In the remainder of this Article, I focus on
four such measures that the Executive Branch might adopt without the
need for additional legislation: discovery obligations, vertical
prosecution, enhanced declination power, and prehearing conferences.
These procedures would work together to increase prosecutorial
accountability and encourage earlier screening of cases for merit and
possible exercises of equitable discretion, while reducing the
asymmetries that can produce inaccurate or unjust results, particularly
when ICE attorneys employ hardball tactics.
I offer two overarching observations before proceeding to my
proposals for reform. First, the most direct route to a more humane
309. Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants Harmed by United States
Deportation Policy, supra note 141, at 16-34.
310. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When
Everything Is a Crime, COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR (July 2013), http://www.columbialawreview.
org/ham-sandwich-nation_Reynolds.
311. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE. L.J. 2650
(2013).
312. See Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation: Fourth and
Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34-35 (1978)
(“[D]eportation proceedings should be deemed ‘criminal’ or ‘quasi-criminal’ in nature . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); Legomsky, supra note 29, at 481 (“[I]mporting the criminal enforcement
model into immigration law without the accompanying criminal adjudication model exposes
the affected noncitizens to harsh consequences without the necessary procedural
safeguards.”); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some
of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 307
(2000) (explaining why traditional constitutional protections in criminal proceedings should
apply in deportation proceedings).
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and efficient enforcement system would involve changes to the
substantive immigration laws that define grounds of inadmissibility,
deportability, and eligibility for relief. Rolling back some of the more
punitive statutory measures enacted in the mid-1990s would greatly
reduce, though not eliminate, the current need for increased
prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement.
But such reforms are not at all likely to take hold. Most
politicians see little benefit in enacting laws that make it easier for
noncitizens to avoid removal. The year 2013 witnessed an epic
struggle to pass a wide-ranging immigration bill.313 It was the fifth
failed comprehensive reform effort of the past decade. Once again, the
breadth of division between opposing camps, the depth of passions on
immigration issues, and the intensity of public scrutiny stood in the
way of change. At this point, it is safe to assume that any legislation
surviving in 2014 will not reduce the code’s expansive, harsh removal
grounds. Instead, if enactment of a legalization program for some
portion of the eleven million undocumented persons in this country
occurs, it is likely to come with a trade-off for strengthened
enforcement measures, both at the border and in the strictness of
substantive criteria for admission and removal. Similarly, although the
right to counsel is arguably the most important procedural measure to
equalize power and achieve justice,314 it is also the most expensive
measure to implement and would likely require congressional action to
be successful nationwide.315 In addition to the financial barriers to the
establishment of a general or limited right to appointed counsel in
313. Rebecca Kaplan, Can Immigration Reform Pass in 2014?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 26,
2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-immigration-reform-pass-in-2014/.
314. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Valazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543-45 (2001) (emphasizing
the role of attorneys in the administration of justice); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31
(1972) (“The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial.”).
For recent arguments in favor of at least a limited right to counsel in immigration court, see
Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J.
2394 (2013); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299
(2011); Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 63 (2012); and Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to
Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000).
315. In 2014, New York City launched the nation’s first indigent immigrant defender
system, training 25 law graduates to provide representation to 135 individuals, funded by a
$500,000 grant from the Robin Hood Foundation. See Kirk Semple, Seeking Better Legal
Help for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/
nyregion/service-program-will-recruit-law-school-graduates-to-help-represent-immi
grants.html?_r=0; Kirk Semple, City To Help Immigrants Seeking Deportation Reprieves,
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2013), http://nytimes.com/2013/07/18/nyregion/city-to-help-immigrantsseeking-deportation-reprieves.html.

60

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1

immigration proceedings, other significant systemic barriers to
ensuring that such representation will be effective will likely persist
and may require additional legal reform.316 The recognition, funding,
and implementation of a broad right to counsel in immigration court
thus faces substantial obstacles.
The second point to observe is that one need not necessarily look
to the criminal system, or frame the problem in terms of prosecutors’
duty to seek justice, to conclude that the existing removal system is in
need of change.317 Regardless of how our criminal system works, when
trial attorneys litigate in ways that fail to live up to their responsibility
to see that justice is done, the values of accuracy,318 consistency,319
efficiency, 320 and fairness 321 —all fundamental objectives of any
administrative adjudicative system—are compromised. These values
are interrelated and connected with other values, as well. For example,
the promotion of correct (and uniform) outcomes promotes the

316. See Keyes, supra note 196 (discussing the persistent culture of poor defense of
immigrants in removal proceedings and the significant institutional pressures hampering
zealous advocacy); Stephen H. Legomsky, Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings:
A Due Process Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 43,
47 (2011) (discussing how the current administrative case law gives adjudicators no
constraints in evaluating effectiveness).
317. For example, as Geoff Heeren demonstrates, in the last half century many
administrative courts have embraced “liberal discovery processes similar to those in civil
litigation.” Heeren, supra note 13, at 1617; see also id. at 1577-78 & n.56 (citing examples of
many administrative agencies that have adopted formal discovery rules that are broader than
those provided in immigration court).
318. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS, supra note 248, at 103-04; Edward K. Cheng, Changing
Scientific Evidence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 315, 322 (2003); Robert Pauw, Judicial Review of
“Pattern and Practice” Cases: What To Do When the INS Acts Unlawfully, 70 WASH. L. REV.
779, 793 (1995) (explaining that both factual and legal determinations should be correct).
319. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS, supra note 248, at 103-04 (explaining that although error
is unavoidable and, therefore, tolerable within limits, agencies are expected to strive to pursue
outcomes that align with the relevant criteria and rules in a given factual situation).
320. Pauw, supra note 318, at 791 (explaining that efficiency goals include minimizing
costs to parties and the government (which are passed on to taxpayers), as well as reducing
waiting times for a decision).
321. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step
Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 262-63 (2002); Roger C. Cramton,

Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate
Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 111-12 (1963); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices
for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1297, 1313 (1986); Pauw, supra note 318, at 796; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing
Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U. N.H. L.
REV. 1, 57 (2012) (describing the author’s efforts to obtain data on individual deferred action
grants by various DHS subagencies and arguing that lack of transparency about the criteria
for deferred action leads to unequal access, inconsistent results, and inefficiencies).
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perception of fairness, public respect for governing legal institutions,
and judicial confidence in the agency’s representations and positions.322
The pursuit of these values might seem to warrant judicial
intervention to promote more due process in removal proceedings.
Judges, however, have a distinctly limited capacity to inject fairness
into immigration court. In general, judicial review is a sluggish form
of challenging agency action. 323 More particularly, Congress has
exempted removal hearings from the Administrative Procedure Act.324
While Fifth Amendment due process does apply, our traditions do not
provide courts with much room to maneuver in overlaying
constitutional protections on the immigration system.325 If anything,
judicial inclinations to impede deportations through procedural
protections may have diminished in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.326
The bottom line is that if change is going to occur in how DHS
processes deportation cases, it is most likely to come from within the
agency.327
V.

MODEST AGENCY REFORMS

Reforming the immigration adjudication system without
congressional legislation must focus on achievable goals. In this Part,
I propose four modest reforms that borrow directly from alreadyexisting practice in the criminal law field. These measures, which
DHS or the Attorney General could readily implement, would not
drastically affect the agency’s enforcement culture. They would,
however, increase the accountability of trial attorneys and incentivize
them to screen cases at an early stage, thus raising the likelihood that
they would (1) exercise discretion more carefully and consistently and
(2) focus limited resources on the most important targets for removal.
Many trial attorneys will continue to litigate removal cases as they do
now, even if agency leaders bolster their already-declared commitment
322. Green, supra note 101, at 271-73.
323. Rubin, supra note 265, at 75.
324. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 654, 662-64 (5th ed. 2009).
325. Legomsky, supra note 316; Motomura, supra note 299.
326. See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional
Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
327. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 248, at 15 (“[T]he task of
improving the quality of administrative justice is one that must be carried forward primarily
by administrators.”); Cade, supra note 11 (arguing that in the absence of an effective judicial
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, ICE prosecutors should administratively
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Rubin, supra note 265, at
75-77.
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to promoting justice in the adjudicative process. Even so, a reduction
of informational disparities, along with increased prehearing
communication, will diminish the likelihood that hardball tactics will
lead to inaccurate and disproportionate results. While the measures
considered here would not replace the benefits of an indigent right to
counsel in immigration court or a rollback of excessively punitive
immigration laws, they are realistic possibilities that could be
implemented in the near future without the congressional intervention
that more far-reaching reforms would require.

A. Discovery Obligations
While ICE has access to vast data stores that it can use against
noncitizens in removal proceedings, noncitizens must initiate and wait
on the results of formal FOIA requests, even to obtain documents in
the government’s A-file that directly concern them. This form of
discovery is cumbersome and inefficient even when successful and is
all but unavailable to those who proceed pro se or while in detention.
Although a variety of discovery innovations may warrant
consideration,328 the most critical reform would require trial attorneys
to turn over contents of the noncitizen’s A-file (excepting confidential
information) upon request or at the first master calendar hearing in
every case where the noncitizen intends to contest removability, seek
relief, or obtain the assistance of counsel.
In criminal proceedings, discovery rules oblige prosecutors to
give defendants access to a variety of information. To be sure, the
criminal defendant’s baseline right of access to material exculpatory
evidence within the government’s possession is grounded in the
Constitution.329 But the disclosure rules in every federal and state
jurisdiction are significantly shaped by a combination of statutes,
professional responsibility rules, common law doctrines, and
administrative policies.330 While subject to significant variation with

328. See Heeren, supra note 13, at 1617-27 (evaluating a range of discovery
measures).
329. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(a) (3d ed. 2007)
(discussing the constitutional sources of a defendant’s right of access to evidence); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
330. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.2(a)-(b) (discussing the statutory and
court rules governing discovery); 6 id. § 24.3(a) (“Various statutes, common law rules, and
constitutional commands combine to shape the capacity of the defense to gain access to
evidence it might use at trial.”); see also 5 id. § 20.1(c) (describing how both the federal
system and the states have “uniformly” expanded defense discovery).
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respect to the timing and content of disclosure obligations, the rules in
all jurisdictions exceed the constitutional minimum.331
In the federal system, Rule 16 mandates disclosure of a broad
range of material, including the defendant’s written and recorded
statements, the substance of oral statements, reports of physical and
medical examinations, and other relevant documents.332 Some federal
district courts have implemented local rules that exceed the scope of
Rule 16,333 and DOJ’s internal guidelines instruct U.S. attorneys that
“[p]roviding broad and early discovery often promotes the truthseeking mission of the Department and fosters a speedy resolution of
many cases.”334 In particular, “[e]xculpatory information . . . must be
disclosed to the defendant reasonably promptly after discovery.”335
Many states’ discovery rules in criminal cases go even further
than the federal rule. The ABA has long recommended liberal defense
access to prosecutors’ files, in recognition of the possibility of
prosecutorial abuse and the inherent difficulty and subjectivity of
identifying relevant or even material evidence.336 In accordance with
various iterations of the ABA guidelines, a small but growing number
of jurisdictions have mandated “open-file discovery,” or something
close to it, thereby giving defense attorneys substantial access to
prosecutorial and law enforcement files involved in investigating or
prosecuting the defendant.337 Over thirty other states stop short of
open-file discovery while still providing for broader disclosure
obligations than the federal rule.338
Discovery rules that give defendants access to evidence in the
government’s possession help ensure that prosecutors do not prioritize
winning cases over achieving justice by capitalizing on information
and power asymmetries. Implementing, at a minimum, a universal A331. See 5 id. § 20.2(c) (discussing variations in the operation of discovery
provisions).
332. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.1(c).
333. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.2(b).
334. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, to Department
Prosecutors, DOJ, DOJ (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/
usam/title9/crm00165.htm.
335. Id. But see United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-29 (2002) (failing to turn
over impeachment material to a defendant does not invalidate a guilty plea). It has never been
squarely decided whether exculpatory evidence need be turned over preplea in federal
criminal proceedings, because so far no one seems to have challenged a United States
Attorney’s decision to withhold that material.
336. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.1(c).
337. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-902 to -910 (2013); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16;
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9; N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:12-2, 3:13-3.
338. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.2(b) nn.32-33.
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file disclosure rule in immigration court would thus further justiceseeking goals in several respects. First, more accessible discovery
would give noncitizens access to critical documents bearing on their
ability to rebut the governments’ charges of deportability or to
establish eligibility for discretionary relief from the immigration judge.
The importance of providing access to applications and documents
previously filed by, or on behalf of, a noncitizen now facing removal is
well illustrated by the Dent litigation.
Second, increased discovery would also improve the removal
system’s administration of justice in a related but distinct way. The
current lack of discovery in immigration court contributes to the
system’s inefficiencies because it elevates the unpredictability of
merits hearings. The inability to access evidence held by the
government exacerbates, for example, the Hobson’s choice created by
one-time-only, last-minute discretionary offers of administrative
closure in cases where noncitizens may be eligible for more significant
adjudicative relief. With better access to evidence the government
intends to introduce at a merits hearing, noncitizens could make more
informed choices about whether to accept administrative closure (or
voluntary departure) in lieu of proceeding to a hearing, thus saving the
government considerable resources.
Third, further-reaching disclosure obligations would have the
likely effect of requiring trial attorneys to take a look at cases earlier in
the process than they currently do. This may not be true if ICE
mechanically serves the entire A-file, but presumably trial attorneys
would first screen the file for information implicating national security
concerns before turning over any material. In low-priority cases with
strong equities, earlier review might encourage trial attorneys to
narrow issues or exercise prosecutorial discretion; in high-priority
cases, an earlier look might lead them to be proactive in developing
further evidence against the noncitizen.
Finally, mandating disclosure obligations would reduce the
chance that a noncitizen with a valid claim to stay is deported on the
basis of the government’s ability to create the appearance of
inconsistencies through surprise cross-examinations. In immigration
proceedings, “[s]urprising the applicant in court with her past
inconsistent statements is the government’s one tried and true means of
challenging . . . credibility.” 339 Yet preventing unfair surprise is a
central reason that more liberal discovery rules were adopted in the
339. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1615.
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criminal system,340 as well as in civil litigation contexts.341 In the words
of Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court, “The truth
is most likely to emerge when each side seeks to take the other by
reason rather than by surprise.”342
It is true that noncitizens with better information may gain an
opportunity to clarify past statements and avoid inconsistencies in
court. But that is the case in all proceedings with discovery
procedures.343 Despite the presence of significant stakes in criminal
proceedings, which opponents of liberalized discovery argued elevate
the defendant’s incentive to commit perjury, the viewpoint that
prosecutions should be “less a game of blindman’s [bluff] and more a
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practicable extent” carried the day.344 There is reason to believe that
trial attorneys currently overrely on wide-ranging cross-examination
based on informational advantages.345 If so, the system as a whole will
benefit if they engage with the merits more directly.
Enhanced disclosure rules should not inhibit ICE’s ability to
obtain removal orders for those persons who lack eligibility to remain
in the United States or who otherwise compromise important public
interests. Federal statutes already exempt national security or
confidential information from ICE’s disclosure obligations.346 And
much of the information in the A-file is gathered, in the first place,
through disclosures made by the respondent from whom the
information is later held back.347
The optimal scope and timing of discovery in immigration court
likely lies somewhere between Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
and open-file discovery. At a minimum, however, noncitizens in
removal proceedings should be provided with the full contents of their
A-file (excluding sensitive or confidential information) upon request
or at the first master calendar hearing, unless they elect not to seek the
assistance of counsel, contest removability, or request relief from
340. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.1(b).
341. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1573-74.
342. Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 228, 249 (1964).
343. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1577-79 (citing to a variety of administrative
proceedings with formal discovery rules).
344. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
345. Heeren, supra note 13.
346. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012) (stating that a noncitizen is not entitled to
examine national security information); id. § 1229a(c)(2) (stating that a noncitizen is not
entitled to have access to records or documents deemed to be confidential).
347. Heeren, supra note 13.
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removal. The opportunity to examine the contents of the A-file early
in the proceedings would significantly aid immigration attorneys in
advising noncitizens as to the appropriate course of action,
contributing in many cases to a more efficient proceeding.
There remains the question of which agency is the right one to
implement discovery-related reforms. As the DOJ has done for United
States attorneys, the DHS could use its supervisory powers to
implement broader disclosure rules for ICE trial attorneys.348 However,
if discovery is primarily a matter of DHS policy, the rules will be
harder to enforce and will likely be exercised inconsistently.
Accordingly, discovery obligations in immigration court are most
likely to be successful if implemented through rule making by the
Attorney General, so that immigration judges have authority and
control over the process. Formal rule making will also give interested
stakeholders an opportunity to weigh in on the scope of discovery
obligations in immigration court, as a range of possibilities are
reasonable (for example, whether noncitizens should have access to
other material in the government’s possession that is related to their
cases but not contained in their A-files). The bottom line is that
measures requiring ICE attorneys, early in the life of a removal case, to
review and turn over any nonconfidential documents in their
possession that bear on an individual’s claims of a right to remain will
heighten the likelihood of a just and efficient outcome.

B.

Vertical Prosecution

Trial attorneys are not assigned to individual cases. Instead, they
typically rotate through the immigration judges’ dockets by date and
become responsible for cases only shortly before merits hearings are
scheduled to take place.349 This arrangement contrasts with the model
employed in many criminal prosecutors’ offices and other civil
enforcement bureaus, where “vertical prosecution” ensures that one
attorney (or a small team) is assigned to handle all aspects of a case
from its arrival in the office to its resolution.350
348. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., DOJ, to All United
States Attorneys, DOJ, DOJ (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-headsdepartment-litigating-components-handling-criminal-matters-all-united-states.
349. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 44-45; Assembly Line Injustice:
Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts, supra note 207, at 18; see ICE, OFFICE
PROCEDURES MANUAL 24 (July 2, 2009) (noting that trial attorney assignments for individual
merits hearings are made one month beforehand) (on file with author).
350. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 304, at 1141 (describing different types of vertical
prosecution arrangements).
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A lack of vertical prosecution in immigration court interferes
with the trial attorney’s capacity to exercise careful discretion for
several reasons. When no prosecutor is assigned to a case, noncitizens
and their counsel are without a meaningful point of contact with whom
to communicate or negotiate. Thus, even if a noncitizen has a clear
right to remain in the country or presents significant equities
warranting prosecutorial leniency or adjudicative discretion, there may
be little chance of communicating these factors effectively until the
case has trudged all the way through the long journey to a final
hearing. Nor is the limited interaction with the prosecutor at the
court’s master calendar hearings sufficient. Master calendars typically
are crowded, all-day affairs with scores of cases to schedule.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the trial attorney relies on a cart full of
unfamiliar A-files to gain only an initial sense of the government’s
allegations and evidence as each case is called by the judge. ICE
attorneys also have important specialized work to do at master
calendar proceedings.
They must, for example, present the
government’s position in uncontested cases and request in absentia
removal orders against respondents who fail to show up.351
Additionally, when trial attorneys do not have ownership over the
cases on the court’s calendar, they have an incentive to pass the buck
along and let someone else consider discretion further down the line.352
In a horizontal model, attorneys do not internalize (or perhaps even
notice) the consequences for individuals whose cases should have been
screened and dropped or negotiated at an earlier stage. On the other
side of the coin, when attorneys are not accountable for cases from
filing (or soon after) to adjudication, they may not fully develop
evidence in the higher priority cases that should have been pursued
most vigorously. Finally, a system of vertical prosecution will increase
transparency and accountability with respect to implementation of the
discovery reforms proposed in the previous Subpart.
For these reasons, ICE should implement vertical prosecution in
every removal case. Indeed, assignments could be made even before
the NTA is filed with the court, so that the trial attorney who will be
prosecuting the matter has ownership and control over whether the
charges are accurate or whether removal should be pursued at all.
351. See discussion supra Part II.B (explaining master calendar hearings).
352. Cf. Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1181 (2004) (“In the lower-level court in which I practice, the
prosecutors very rarely appear on their own cases. They read from a note in the file, have no
personal knowledge about the case in front of them and precious little discretion.”).
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Although in some field offices ICE attorneys are given the
responsibility to review some NTAs before filing, such occurrences
are not mandated by any agency-wide policies and occur only
sporadically. Moreover, an ICE attorney might approach the review of
an NTA that he or she likely will be responsible for prosecuting more
carefully than one to be handled by others.
Program administrators may raise questions about whether
prefiling assignments make sense, however. They might emphasize
that many noncitizens choose not to contest their proceedings and
simply consent to being removed right away, thus reducing the need for
vertical integration. Furthermore, some agency supervisors have
argued that resource limitations preclude assigning one attorney to
each case in light of inevitable scheduling conflicts. 353 These
objections should be taken seriously but are not deal breakers for the
need for vertical prosecution.
First, in many hearing locations there are only a few sitting
immigration judges, obviating or at least reducing scheduling
difficulties.354 Moreover, even in the busier jurisdictions, each trial
attorney could be assigned to a particular immigration judge’s docket
as a routine matter. That way, when a case is filed in immigration
court it would be assigned to both prosecutor and judge at the same
time, so that scheduling conflicts would be minimized. To further
increase efficiency, judge-prosecutor assignments could be made
provisional until the noncitizen’s first master calendar appearance.
This would allow maximum flexibility in the event the respondent
chooses not to contest removal.
When a government attorney becomes part of a working group
with a particular judge, there is some risk that the judge will over time
tend to defer to, rather than second-guess, a de facto working partner.355
353. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 45.
354. EOIR Immigration Court Listing, supra note 154.
355. See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 27-28, 32-34 (1977) (explaining that
working groups strive to maintain cohesion and reduce conflict within the courtroom);
HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 234 (3d ed. 1993) (contending that the
dynamics of courtroom working groups encourage plea bargain settlements); Eric Lane, Due
Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 966 (2003) (“In a setting in
which the defense counsel . . . , the prosecutor, and the judge are all ‘regulars,’ in that they
work together daily in the same courtroom, they develop shared goals, attitudes, and rules of
conduct that allow the system to work . . . .”); Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men:
The Sentencing Judge’s Dilemma, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 829 (1998)
(“Accommodation to each other’s priorities is the rule, however, not just because of the
payoffs it offers, but because the work group comes to share professional values and
experiences.”). Additionally, vertical schemes can produce inconsistencies between
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This concern might give pause when regularly assigning trial attorneys
to particular immigration judges’ dockets. But in fact, similar
relationships already exist between trial attorneys and immigration
judges in many immigration courts, in light of the frequency of their
contact, their shared government employment, and the fact that a
majority of immigration judges take the bench after serving as trial
attorneys.356 This is not to suggest impropriety, but rather to observe
that—as in many courts—working relationships between regular
participants already are a norm in immigration court.357 Moreover,
even if some danger of undue prosecutorial “capture” exists, it is likely
outweighed by gains in accountability, efficiency, and depth of
knowledge that vertical arrangements present.358
Recently, a few but growing number of chief counsel offices have
experimented with “unit prosecution,” assigning each case to a team of
attorneys.359 In anonymous interviews, trial attorneys I spoke with
from two such offices reported that the change has increased pretrial
communication between noncitizens and ICE, particularly with respect
to requests for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.360 Both also
reported that the measure had reduced, to some extent, the incentive to
pass the buck.361 Although it is early to assess the gains of experiments
in team-based prosecution, these initial reports provide a promising
prosecutors, particularly if there ends up being a prosecutor-judge alliance in the courtroom.
See also Levine, supra note 304, at 1141 (discussing the pros and cons of vertical prosecution
arrangements). Each immigration court may have a consistent internal approach, but one that
differs from other jurisdictions.
356. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 185.
357. See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30 (2012)
(discussing working groups among criminal prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys).
358. Cf. Lane, supra note 355, at 958, 962-67, 974-78 (acknowledging the problem of
threats to judicial neutrality in problem-solving courts, but concluding they compare
favorably to traditional courts and will be successful with sufficient attention to procedural
precautions). Of course, immigration courts are very different from problem-solving courts,
in that the latter forum’s prosecutor is no longer trying to convict or punish and the judge’s
range of outcomes may be more flexible.
359. See SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note 107, at 17-21
(describing unit prosecution in the San Antonio office); Cavendish & Schulman, supra note
97, at 45 (indicating that offices implementing unit prosecution include Los Angeles,
Chicago, San Antonio, and San Francisco).
360. See Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Large Urban Office, supra note 79;
Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office, supra note 76 (framed in
terms of “accountability”); see also id. (stating that unit prosecution was really just a
formalization of an already existing de facto policy, due to the small size of her office).
361. Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Large Urban Office, supra note 79;
Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office, supra note 76 (pointing out
that prosecutorial discretion requests were the only instances where she believed the shift to
formal unit prosecution was making a difference).
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signal. However, even where unit prosecution has been implemented,
teams are not typically assigned until an individual merits hearing is
scheduled, defeating some of the gains that could be realized through
earlier assignments.362
Vertical prosecution could be implemented as a matter of DHS
policy without any agency rule making and at relatively little
additional expense to the government. In fact, vertical integration will
produce efficiencies by reducing inefficiency-generating handoffs,
even if some problematic staffing complications result. Most
important, vertical staffing holds the potential of heightening
individualized assessment by, and communication with, ICE attorneys
as they process cases. And if such assessment and communication
occur, the opportunities for achieving justice in removal proceedings
will be enhanced.

C.

Increased Responsibility and Authority for Screening and
Declining Cases

The discretionary right of prosecutors not to pursue a criminal
prosecution has long been recognized.363 The initial decision to decline
prosecution is the most protected from scrutiny. This makes sense
because prosecutors are likely to be better positioned than other actors
in the criminal justice system to determine whether a particular
prosecution that they will be responsible for prosecuting is warranted,
according to the magnitude of the offense, the community’s norms, the
strength of the evidence, the available resources, the wishes of the
victim, and other factors.
In many cases, ICE trial attorneys do not have the opportunity to
exercise independent judgment about whether to file removal
proceedings in cases that they will be responsible for litigating.364
Other government officers and agencies share the authority to
commence removal proceedings, and no rule or agency practice
requires or even regularly facilitates the review of an NTA by any
attorney before it is filed with the immigration court. And, as the BIA
has interpreted agency regulations, trial attorneys are divested of the
362. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note 107, at
18-21 (explaining that the trial attorney “present at the last master calendar where an IC
merits hearing is set will inherit the case to completion” unless there is a conflict, in which
case another attorney in the unit will handle the case).
363. Reiss, supra note 297, at 1368.
364. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013) (“In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”).
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authority to withdraw NTAs, even if legally insufficient, that already
have been filed with the immigration court. 365 Instead, once
jurisdiction vests with the court, the trial attorney can only file a
motion asking a judge to administratively close or terminate
proceedings. In short, ICE attorneys have insufficient tools and
incentives to decline to prosecute removal proceedings early on in
appropriate cases.
The problem could be addressed through implementation of a
policy requiring that ICE lawyers screen all incoming cases before
proceedings are initiated in immigration court.366 If trial attorneys are
to be assigned cases, either individually or as a team, before they are
filed, it would be most appropriate for that particular attorney (or
group) to consider whether the NTA should be filed with the court. If
trial attorneys are not assigned to individual cases until further along in
the proceedings (such as at the first master calendar), then prefiling
NTA review should be made by any attorney in the office who might
be responsible for the case shortly down the line. This would increase
the likelihood of careful review and help facilitate the exercise of
independent judgment.
It is true that a trial attorney sometimes may have insufficient
information before a case is filed to determine whether a dismissal or
other step back is warranted. Still, in many cases the equities will be
ascertainable from documents in the A-file, which may include the
noncitizen’s length of residence, immigration history, medical records,
employment and tax records, criminal history, country of origin, and
so on. Oftentimes it will be apparent at the outset whether the person
would appear to be a good candidate for discretion. In close cases,
trial attorneys could give respondents an opportunity to provide
additional information, ideally with the assistance of counsel who has
had the opportunity to review nonconfidential information in the
government’s A-file. At a minimum, giving trial attorneys greater
screening responsibility would give them the incentive to review NTAs
for insufficiency and error, and the ability to quickly get rid of those
that should not be in court at all.
Another reform that should be considered is whether to increase
ICE attorneys’ authority to independently dismiss cases, even after
they have been filed. Under the current system, trial attorneys who
wish to decline to pursue a removal case that is already under the
365. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2 (2014).
366. To File or Not To File a Notice To Appear: Improving the Government’s Use of
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 175, at 60 (making this recommendation).
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jurisdiction of EOIR can exercise discretion to file a motion, but then
the immigration judge must adjudicate whether to administratively
close the case.367 To be sure, immigration judges often grant such
motions, especially when the noncitizen supports that outcome. After
all, immigration judges seek to clear their dockets and in fact are
subject to case completion goals.368 Because immigration judges may
deny motions to close proceedings for any number of reasons,369
however, trial attorneys may hesitate to screen cases carefully once
filed with the court. Should ICE have increased authority to dismiss
removal prosecutions even after jurisdiction has vested with the
immigration court?
Here again, recourse to criminal practice is useful. At common
law, even after the filing of formal charges, prosecutors were generally
allowed to withdraw from continuing to prosecute.370 Concern over
unbridled nolle prosequi power led many jurisdictions to implement
judicial or legislative rules requiring prosecutors to at least explain
their reasons for dropping a prosecution in writing. 371 In some
jurisdictions this requirement attaches after formal indictment, while in
others prosecutors are free to drop prosecutions without giving a
reason up until a preliminary hearing.372 The federal rule, like that of
many states, requires a judge’s leave to dismiss an indictment. But as a
leading case has instructed, “The exercise of [the executive’s]
discretion with respect to the termination of pending prosecution
should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest
public interest.”373

367. In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012).
368. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 4 (2006).
369. In Avetisyan, the BIA set forth factors for the immigration judge to weigh in
ruling on a motion to administratively close proceedings, including (1) the reason
administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure;
(3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he
or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure;
(5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay;
and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the
proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared. See Avetisyan, 25 I.
& N. Dec. at 696.
370. See DAVIS, supra note 28.
371. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 13.3(c).
372. Id.
373. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975); see also 4 LAFAVE ET
AL., supra note 329, § 13.3(c) n.44 (discussing the requirements for judicial approval of nolle
prosequi).
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In essence, then, a criminal prosecutor’s early decision to
withdraw a pending prosecution will generally be granted unless the
reasons given somehow violate manifest public interest, but judicial
scrutiny increases as proceedings progress.374 Some variation of these
rules could be workable in immigration court, too. Trial attorneys
could be required to file a written statement explaining why an NTA is
being withdrawn, and immigration judges could retain the power to
reject that action in proceedings where doing so would be at
significant odds with the public interest, for example if the noncitizen
appears to have recent and serious criminal convictions or to be a
threat to national security. At some point, perhaps at the first master
calendar or other hearing, trial attorneys would lose the authority to
independently cancel NTAs (subject to scrutiny). At that step, trial
attorneys would need to make a motion to administratively close
proceedings.
Increasing ICE prosecutors’ power to dismiss so that it more
closely resembles the nolle prosequi norms in the criminal system
would help facilitate just outcomes in many removal proceedings.
This is especially true if the current system continues, in which other
officials can initiate proceedings without the input of ICE prosecutors.
In tandem with a move towards vertical prosecution, trial attorneys
should screen at an early stage all cases that they will have
responsibility for handling in the event that an adjudicative hearing
occurs. If the attorney knows they will be accountable for the case
down the line, there is an increased incentive to more carefully review
the merits of prosecution earlier in the proceedings. The ability to
quickly dispose of cases at the outset that in the trial attorney’s
independent judgment should not be pursued will help reduce
excessive caseloads and allow them to focus on the cases that matter
most. At the very least, the existing system generates delay and
inefficiencies, as in many cases all concerned parties believe judicial
dismissal to be appropriate.
To be sure, enhancing the trial attorney’s power to decline
prosecution after proceedings have commenced would slightly reduce
the immigration judge’s authority. But under the measures suggested
in this Part, the encroachment would not be significant, since
immigration judges could retain the authority to reject ICE’s
withdrawal of a removal prosecution if clearly contrary to the public
interest. It would also be time-limited; at some point along the
374. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 13.3(c).
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progression of proceedings ICE could only make a motion to
administratively close, subject to immigration judge approval, as is the
case now.
For these reasons, DHS should implement a rule or policy
requiring that its trial attorneys review all NTAs before they are filed
with the immigration court. Additionally, the Attorney General should
consider amending existing DOJ regulations to provide that, even after
jurisdiction vests with the immigration court, trial attorneys have the
authority to cancel NTAs through written submission to the court, for
legal insufficiency or for any reason, unless determined by the
immigration judge to be clearly contrary to the public interest (and
subject to some cutoff point such as the first appearance). Again,
enhanced responsibility and authority to decline cases, whether before
or after the commencement of proceedings, will work best in tandem
with a system of vertical prosecution.

D.

Prehearing Case Conferences

The life of most criminal cases begins and ends before ever
reaching trial. The vast majority of criminal prosecutions are resolved
through plea agreements or (to a much lesser extent) motion practice.375
In this scheme, prehearing conferences are critical to giving the parties
the opportunity to communicate, negotiate, and resolve cases.
Current agency regulations contemplate prehearing conferences
in removal proceedings.376 The Immigration Court Practice Manual
also specifically sets out procedures for meetings of this kind.377 In the
real world, however, these pretrial conferences do not frequently occur.
Immigration judges rarely schedule them with parties. Savvy
attorneys typically must file motions in order to request a prehearing
conference and then wait for the immigration judge to adjudicate the
motion and schedule the conference, perhaps far in the future. And of
course, nothing ensures that the trial attorney who appears on behalf of

375. See Roberts, supra note 311 (explaining the need for the right to effective
assistance in plea bargains in light of the fact that very few criminal cases proceed to trial).
376. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.21(a) (2014) (“Pre-hearing conferences may be scheduled at the
discretion of the Immigration Judge. The conference may be held to narrow issues, to obtain
stipulations between the parties, to exchange information voluntarily, and otherwise to
simplify and organize the proceeding.”).
377. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, The Immigration Court Practice Manual,
DOJ 82-83, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_1-27-14.pdf#
page=67 (last modified June 10, 2013); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 324, at
653-54.
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the government at a pretrial conference will be ultimately responsible
for the case.
As in many criminal prosecution systems, respondents in
immigration court should have the opportunity to confer with
knowledgeable, accountable trial attorneys before any hearing on the
merits. This would facilitate the exchange of information, narrowing
of issues, and potential settlement of cases. In addition, and
importantly, prehearing conferences would encourage trial attorneys to
look at cases more closely before the eve of trial. If vertical
prosecution were also implemented, trial attorneys would be better
incentivized to take advantage of a prehearing opportunity to gauge the
strength of the noncitizens’ case and potentially narrow the issues in
cases they will likely be responsible for down the line.
Some noncitizens may not wish to engage in prehearing
conferences and should be permitted to decline to request such
meetings, so as not to waste ICE attorneys’ time. Moreover,
prehearing conferences could often be of value without immigration
judge supervision, thus limiting their impact on the overall operation
of the adjudication system.378
This reform should be accomplished through rule making by
DHS or the Attorney General. Alternatively, DHS could institute an
internal policy of offering prehearing conferences, or immigration
judges could make a practice of encouraging parties to employ the
existing practice manual provisions. But, without an enforceable
default rule, workload and enforcement pressures—as well as
traditional practice—will push against prosecutor participation, despite
the overall efficiency gains promised by prehearing communication.
The better course would therefore involve adopting a formal and
mandatory rule rather than mere managerial policy.

E.

Resource Objections

Some will raise objections to these proposed reforms based on
resource constraints. As an initial matter, the strength of those
arguments turns on how much we value the justice-seeking norms that
the system currently fails to provide.379 Our country’s legal standards
378. However, if supervision by the immigration judge is required or desired, there
would need to be a sufficient buy-in for this reform because the court might need to maintain
a separate pretrial calendar.
379. Several DHS policies enacted or expanded under the Obama Administration
suggest that it is sometimes willing to undertake policies that prioritize the administration of
justice despite increased bureaucratic complexity and expense, including Morton’s
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largely bespeak a strong commitment to fair dealing and getting things
right. Accordingly, adding mechanisms to further those values in
institutions where they are not yet fully realized is an endeavor the
government may wish to undertake, even where doing so is not
costless.
But the economic argument, even taken on its own terms, may
not pose a persuasive objection. Under the current system, noncitizens
win the right to stay in roughly 50% of cases in which ICE seeks a
removal order.380 Additionally, a sizeable number of persons ordered
removed eventually win their cases on appeal.381 And if, as studies
have suggested, fewer noncitizens in removal proceedings were
unrepresented or subject to detention, there is reason to expect the
government would prevail in even fewer cases.382
It would be ludicrous to suggest that the system must have a
100% success rate, but when one of every two cases fails to result in a
removal order, scarce resources clearly are being expended on some
removal prosecutions that should not have been pursued in the first
place. With the addition of procedures to encourage earlier screening,
accountability, and information flow, many of those cases would rise to
the surface more quickly, releasing those persons from the hardships
exacted by the system and freeing up the government to go all in on
the cases that matter most. Seen in this way, the cost of implementing
the additional procedures considered in this Part is likely offset by
gains in efficiency, as well as in justice.
In terms of numbers, deporting one person likely costs the
government somewhere between $12,500 and $23,480.383 Additionally,
prosecutorial discretion initiative and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.
See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), USCIS, http://www.
uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated
Sept. 9, 2014).
380. ICE Targeting: Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported by Immigration Judge,
supra note 181. This figure is up from the already high percentage of cases in which ICE was
unable to convince immigration judges to order removal between FY2001 and FY2010,
which averaged around 25%. ICE Seeks To Deport the Wrong People, supra note 182, fig.1
& accompanying tabular details.
381. See Letter from Crystal Souza to Thomas Striepe, supra note 186 (presenting data
on noncitizen appeals to the BIA that are remanded or sustained); Becker & McDonnell,
supra note 171 (citing sources discussing erroneous detention and removal of U.S. citizens);
see also Rosenbloom, supra note 109, at 146-53 (discussing errors in removal proceedings
leading to wrongful deportations).
382. See Markowitz et al., supra note 169.
383. See Jana Kasperkevic, Deporting All Of America’s Illegal Immigrants Would
Cost a Whopping $285 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/deporting-all-of-americas-illegal-immigrants-would-cost-a-whopping-285-billion2012-1#ixzz2kd8kUJ2b (contrasting the ICE deputy director’s 2011 statement to Congress
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deportations generate expenses beyond those to the federal
government. For example, a recent report estimates that if noncitizens
in detention had access to a lawyer, New York State would save nearly
$2 million annually through reduced spending on public health
insurance programs, foster care services, and lost tax revenue, while
employers would save an additional $4 million annually by avoiding
turnover-related costs.384 These figures do not suggest that deportable
noncitizens should never be deported. They do, however, bolster the
arguments for adding measures that heighten prosecutorial scrutiny of
the merits of pursuing removal early in every case—ideally before
charges are ever filed—in the interests of accuracy, efficiency, and
equitable considerations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current removal adjudication system allows trial attorneys to
prosecute removal with little regard for their duty to see justice done.
For many noncitizens, the government’s charges trigger mandatory or
discretionary civil detention, in which noncitizens are transferred to
prison-like conditions (or actual prisons), far from family and
community support. The case then joins a massive backlog and waits,
often languishing for over a year before the immigration judge finally
reaches the merits of the government’s prosecution, and sometimes
lingers years more before the noncitizen’s eligibility for relief is finally
assessed. 385 Many respondents are unable to access counsel or
evidence during this time, and even if they are able to find
representation, attempts to communicate or negotiate with ICE before
a hearing may be futile. Noncitizens potentially eligible for
adjudicative relief from removal might be offered the opportunity to
close the case just before their individual hearing and on a take-it-orleave-it basis. Due to the government’s vast informational advantages
and the prosecutor’s potential nondisclosure of any evidence in the
noncitizen’s favor, the deal might seem worth it even though it leaves
the noncitizen in perilous limbo. Those perseverant individuals who
do venture to a hearing—pro se if they cannot afford an attorney or
that the cost of deportation per person is $12,500 with a 2010 report by the Center for
American Progress finding the cost to be $23,480).
384. See The New York Immigrant Family Unity Project: Good for Families, Good for
Employers, and Good for All New Yorkers, CENTER FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY 5, 10-14,
http://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/immigrant_family_unity_project_print_layout.
pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
385. Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, supra note 136.
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find pro bono counsel—may face a prosecutor willing to capitalize on
any mistake, advantage, or vulnerability in order to secure a removal
order. This system simply cannot be characterized as consistently
producing just results.
The agency should continue to encourage and train its attorneys
to exercise discretion consistently and to litigate cases in ways that
develop full and fair records. But it also should recognize that ICE
prosecutors operate under significant pressures, including an
omnipresent concern for national security and massive caseloads.
Accordingly, as with criminal prosecutors, the overall performance of
trial attorneys would benefit from concrete procedural rules that
increase their accountability and incentives to seek justice. Four
workable reforms could make a difference right away: vertical
prosecution in all offices, improved access to trial attorneys through
prehearing conferences, enhanced power to screen and decline cases,
and heightened disclosure obligations. While the procedural rules
discussed in this Article would not fully rectify the harshness and
inefficiencies of the current removal system, they are realistic reforms
by which the Executive Branch can reshape the role of ICE
prosecutors in a way that benefits all participants in the immigration
system, and the nation as a whole.

